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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Federal Government Prohibited From Using State
Compelled Testimony or Fruits Thereof Against a Witness in a Federal
Prosecution.- Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a bearing of
the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, a bi-state body. After re-
fusing to answer questions on the ground of possible self-incrimination, pe-
titioners were granted immunity from state prosecution in New York and New
Jersey. Petitioners still refused to answer the questions in view of possible
federal prosecution to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend,
and they were held in civil and criminal contempt of court. The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the criminal contempt judgment on procedural
grounds, but sustained the civil contempt judgment on its merits.1 The
United States Supreme Court held that the federal government could not
make use of state compelled testimony and that the witness could therefore
be compelled to testify; but the Court reversed and dismissed both the civil
and criminal contempt judgments on the ground that the petitioners had a
reasonable fear that the federal government might use the answers against
them in a federal prosecution.2 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964).
The fifth amendment guarantee that no person can be compelled to give
incriminating testimony against himself is derived from English common
law.3 The English Court of Chancery held, in King of the Two Sicilies v.
Villcox, that the rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination did
not protect a witness from disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of an-
other country. Although this case has been followed in several American deci-
sions, 5 it was specifically limited to its facts by the English Court of Chancery
Appeals in United States v. Mc Rae.0 The Mc Rae decision is accepted
as the most authoritative anouncement of the English rule7 which holds that
1. Application of the Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 39 N.J. 436, 189 A2d 36
(1963).
2. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 4S7 (1944), held that testimony compled by a
state court could be introduced into evidence in the federal courts. This caE has bken
specifically overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 373 U.. 52, 77 (1964).
3. See Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 244, 2S Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750); East India
Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749).
4. 7 State Tr. (N.S.) 1049 (1351).
5. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1953); United States v. Murdock, 2S4 US. 141
(1931). Both of the above cases were specifically overruled in Murphy, 378 U.S. at 76, 77,
as well as the cases upon which they relied, such as Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
6. L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1S67). The United States sued in an English Court to recover
money which defendant had received as an agent of the Confederate States during the Civil
War. The defendant refused to answer questions which would have exposed him to for-
feiture and penalty under the laws of the United States, and the court upheld his plea.
7. "The witness is protected . . . as to crimes, penalties and forfeitures cognizable not
only by English but foreign law, provided the foreign law be dearly proved or admitted."
Phipson, Evidence 199 (6th ed. 1921), cited in Grant, Immunity From Compulsory Sell-
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the witness is now protected from answering any question which has any
tendency to expose him to criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction if
that danger be real and apparent.
The majority in the instant case relied on this change in the English rule
to explain any inconsistency in prior rulings of the Court. There are two
discernible lines of cases involving self-incrimination, but neither depends
wholly upon the interpretation of the English rule. One line deals with the
privilege against self incrimination in and of itself, while the other deals
with immunity statutes in regard to the fifth amendment.
The Court in the instant case relied on United States v. Saline Bank8 and
Ballman v. Fagin9 as correctly interpreting the English rule to be that any
danger of incrimination in another jurisdiction is sufficient to invoke the
fifth amendment privilege. In Saline Bank, the Government brought suit in
the district court to recover certain bank deposits. Defendants resisted dis-
covery on the ground that they would incriminate themselves under the laws
of Virginia, and the Court upheld this plea. This decision was followed
in Ballman, where petitioner, claiming possible incrimination under state
law, successfully refused to answer certain questions before a federal grand
jury. Both these cases defined the extent of the privilege against self-in-
crimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment: a witness in a federal court
can invoke the privilege against self-incrimination if there is any danger of
incrimination in another jurisdiction. However, United States v. Murdock' °
held on the authority of King of Two Sicilies,n that the privilege does not
include the possibility of prosecution in another jurisdiction. The instant Court
specifically overruled Murdock and adopted the rule of Saline Bank and
Ballman. 0
The reverse situation, where a witness in a state court asserts the privilege
because of possible federal prosecution, was before the Court in Jack v.
Kansas.12 There the witness refused to testify when granted immunity from
state, but not federal prosecution, and was held in contempt. The Court
noted that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was ap-
plicable only to a witness in a federal court and refused to apply the fifth
amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Under the state
Incrimination in a Federal System of Government, 9 Temp. L.Q. 57, 61-62 (1934). See also
Grant, Federalism and Self Incrimination, 4 U.C.LAJ. Rev. 549 (1957).
8. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828).
9. 200 U.S. 186 (1906).,
10. 284 U.S. 141 (1931). The defendant was indicted in a federal court for refusing to
supply information to federal revenue agents. Defendant claimed possible state prosecution,
but the Court held that fear of state prosecution did not justify a refusal to answer ques-
tions by federal officials, citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), which relied on King
of Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 7 State Tr. (N.S.) 1049 (1851). In Hale, the appellant was held
in contempt of a federal court for refusing to answer questions on the ground that he
was not protected from state prosecution. The Court stated that the only danger to be
considered is the one arising within the same jurisdiction.
11. Supra note 12. But see United States v. Mc Rae, L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867).
12. 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
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law the witness was protected only against giving testimony which would
be incriminating in that jurisdiction. Today, however, due to Malloy v. Hogan"s
the fifth amendment is applicable to the states. Thus, the present Court rea-
soned that a witness in a state court can now refuse to testify if he fears
prosecution in another jurisdiction.' 4
The Court in the instant case also dealt with the scope of a state immunity
statute in relation to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The privilege is an absolute right to remain silent; the exception is a grant
of immunity. Immunity is a separate aspect of self-incrimination and is not
necessarily synonymous with it. However, it has been held that the grant
of immunity to be valid must be co-extensive with the privilege.'0 Although
the immunity must be as broad as the privilege, a state does not have the
power to grant immunity from a federal prosecution. Therefore, a state im-
munity statute cannot be co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and on this basis a witness should not be compelled to testify.
The Court in the present case recognized the inadequacy of the state im-
munity statute in light of possible federal prosecution, but refused to allow
the witness to remain silent. Rather, the Court stated that the introduction
of evidence derived from state compelled testimony, or the fruits of it, would
be inadmissible in a federal prosecution.' 0 This is the first time since Counsci-
man v. Hitchcock'7  that the Court considered whether the fifth amendment
barred only the fruits of compelled testimony, or was an absolute bar to any
future prosecution.
In Counselman, the Court declared a federal immunity statute unconstitu-
tional because it prohibited only the use of the compelled testimony in a
criminal proceeding and did not protect the witness against the indirect use
of his compelled testimony by searching out other sources of information upon
which he might be convicted. The Court stated: "We are dearly of [the]
opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecu-
tion after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the
effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United
States."I'8 Counse!nan required that the immunity statute must he co-extensive
13. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
14. 378 U.S. at 77-7S. "What is accorded is a privilege of refusing to incriminate one's
self, and the feared prosecution may be by either federal or state authoritiezs. Malloy v.
Hogan, 37S U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
15. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 535 (IS92). The Court stated that "legisla-
tion cannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and . . . cannot replace or supply one, at
least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect."
16. "[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compeIed
to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled tezti-
mony and its fruits can not be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with
a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover, that . . . the Federal
Government must be prohibited from making any such use of the compelled testimony
and its fruits." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 373 U.S. at 79.
17. 142 U.S. 547 (1392).
18. Id. at 535.
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with the privilege against self-incrimination and the witness must be protected
against any future prosecution resulting from the use of the testimony. Brown
v. Walker'9 sustained a federal immunity statute which prohibited any future
prosecution, state or federal, concerning any matter disclosed in the compelled
testimony. Subsequent federal immunity statutes have conformed to Counsel-
man and Brown in prohibiting future prosecution.20 Apparently the instant
Court did not feel that the immunity, to be adequate, must prohibit all
future prosecutions. It necessarily views Counselman as announcing no more
than a preclusionary rule of evidence. It would then follow that, while the
federal government is prohibited from using compelled testimony and its
fruits, it is not precluded from all future prosecutions concerning that com-
pelled testimony. How real the possibility of future federal prosecution is,
remains to be seen. It is reasonable to expect the Court to find any evidence
discovered after state compelled testimony to be the fruit of the compelled
testimony.21 Further, the Court here stated that the federal government will
have the burden of proving that its evidence is untainted and unconnected with
the state compelled testimony,22 and it seems, the only conceivable situation
where there would be entire freedom from suspicion is where the evidence
had been acquired before the witness testified in a state court.
Thus, a state witness may be placed in the advantageous position of
immunizing himself from federal prosecution. The state prosecutor may not
appreciate the extent to which the federal government will be hampered if
the state grants the witness immunity, since he has little chance of knowing
what the witness' testimony will reveal. Testimony under a state grant of
immunity for an apparently inconsequential charge may reveal a more grievous
federal offense with the result that federal law enforcement may be frustrated.
Realistically viewed, power is vested in the states to control or limit federal
execution of federal policies. It is open to question whether this decision is
consistent with the concept of federal supremacy so long espoused by the
Supreme Court and, in particular, by the present bench.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Religion-New Jersey Supreme Court
Orders Pregnant Jehovah Witness To Consent to Blood Transfusion To
Save Unborn Child.-Plaintiff hospital sought a determination of its rights to
administer blood transfusions to the 32-week pregnant defendant, who based her
refusal upon the first amendment freedom of religion guarantee. Defendant was
a Jehovah Witness, a sect believing that the administration of blood is contrary
19. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
20. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2281 n.11 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
21. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) where it is stated that
"the privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a
conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal
crime." Accord, United States v. Trigilio, 255 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v.
Costello, 222 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Doto, 205 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1953).
22. 378 U.S. at 79 & n.18.
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to the teachings of the Bible.' While defendant was in no immediate danger, the
evidence showed a probability that hemorrhaging would develop prior to delivery
and that, in such an event, both the mother and child would die unless blood
transfusions were given to the mother. The New Jersey Supreme Court, reversing
a chancery division decision,2 held that the first amendment does not prevent
a state court from ordering that an expectant mother be transfused for the
purpose of saving the unborn child. The case was remanded for the appointment
of a special guardian for the unborn child, for an order that the guardian consent
to such transfusions as the physician in charge deemed necessary to preserve
the lives of the mother and child, and for an order directing the mother to
submit to the transfusions. Raleigh Fitkin-Pad Morgan Memorial Hosp. V.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964) (per curiam).
The court relied upon two precedents in reaching its decision. The first was
the case of Smith v. Brennan3 which held that a child who was born alive could
recover for any negligently inflicted prenatal injury. Insofar as that precedent
is pertinent here, it merely established that an unborn child has a legally
recognized "right to begin life with a sound mind and body."4
The second case relied upon was that of State v. PcrriconeP which involved
an action under a "neglect" statuteO to appoint a guardian for the "blue baby"
of Jehovah Witness parents. The evidence was that the child would die in the
absence of a transfusion whereas its chances of living would be greatly enhanced
by transfusions. The court found that the religiously inspired refusal by the
parents of permission to administer a blood transfusion constituted neglect of
the child within the meaning of the statute and a guardian was appointed and
ordered to consent to the recommended treatment.
In the instant case, the court reasoned that in view of Smith v. Brennan the
1. Jehovah Witnesses believe that a blood transfusion is comparable to eating blood
which is forbidden by various passages of the Bible. See, e.g., Leviticus 17:10-14 and
Genesis 9:4.
2. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hasp. v. Ander-on, Civil No. C-2825-63,
N.J. Super. Ct., June 12, 1964.
3. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960). Accord, Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del.
258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Amann v. Faidy, 415 111.422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (19S3); DamalewicZ
v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Rainey v. Horna, 221 M is. 269, 72 So. 2d
434 (1950); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953) and Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.A. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
4. Smith v. Brennan, supra note 3 at 364, 157 A.2d at 503. The court said that this
right exists whether or not the child is viable. Compare Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
5. 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962), 12 DePaul L.
Rev. 342, 34 Miss. L.J. 219, 24 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 642, 8 Vill. L. Rev. 114, 65 NV. Va. L. Rev.
184.
6. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-9 (1960). "When the parents of any minor child... shall neglect
to provide the child with proper protection, maintenance and education . . . it chall
be lawful for any person interested in the welfare of such child to institute an action
in the Superior Court or the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ... for the purpose of
having the child brought before the court, and for the further relief provided by this
chapter. The court may proceed in the action in a summary manner or otherwse."
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
fact that the child was unborn would not distinguish State v. Perricone. Since
the "neglect statute" applies only to "minor children," it is implicit in the
decision that an unborn child is a minor child within the meaning of the statute.
This upholds a 1961 decision by the New Jersey Superior Court which awarded
custody of an unborn child to a temporary guardian who was ordered to consent
to blood transfusions for the child after it was born.7
The bedrock of the American legal tradition embodies two basic rights:
the right to freely practice one's religion and the right of the parent to determine
and direct the course of development for his child. Although both of these
rights are to be accorded the highest possible respect in the law,8 neither is
without limitation. 9 The recognized right and duty of the state as parens
patriae'° in overseeing the welfare of its children have at times, such as in the
instant case, come into conflict with these rights of the individual and the
courts have traditionally attempted to strike a balance between these freedoms
and the general welfare of society."
The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of religion has two aspects: the freedom to believe and the freedom to
7. Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961). This case involved
a pregnant Jehovah Witness whose blood was classified as Rh negative, and was Incom-
patible with that of the unborn child. The evidence established beyond a doubt that the
child would die unless a blood transfusion was administered soon after birth.
8. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Court struck down a
resolution of the Board of Education requiring all teachers and pupils to salute the flag
when the parents of Jehovah Witness children objected on the ground that their children
were being forced to pay homage to a "graven image." See Exodus 20:4-5. See also, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 604, 123 A.2d
3, 6 (1956).
9. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (statute prohibiting sale of
religious magazines by children under 12 years of age held constitutional); Sadlock v.
Board of Educ., 137 N.J.L. 85, 91, 58 A.2d 218, 222 (1948) (upheld statute requiring
school children to be vaccinated even though contrary to the parents' religion). See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (dictum) where the Court said that
freedom of religion "embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulations for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition
to preserve the enforcement of that protection."
10. The term "parens patriae" means "father of his country" and refers to the right
and duty of the sovereign to protect any person, such as a child, who is under a disability.
Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955); Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq.
517, 519-20, 128 AtI. 254, 255 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925). The term was originally used In
reference to the King of England and now refers to the sovereign people. Helton v. Cawley,
241 Iowa 296, 312-13, 41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950). The power of the state to fulfill its duty
as parens patriae is inherently vested in the courts of equity. Arnold v. Arnold, 246 Ala.
86, 91-92, 18 So. 2d 730, 734 (1944).
11. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463,
181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J.
Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957).
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act in accordance with that belief.' While the freedom to believe is absolute, the
freedom to act is limited insofar as ie adversely affects the public weal or the
well-being of a child.13 Similarly, the natural right of the parent to care for the
child is limited by the paramount consideration for the welfare of the child."4
With these limitations in mind, the courts have many times ordered medical
treatment for children in spite of the objections founded upon the religion of
the parents.15 Several cases involving blood transfusions are in agreement with
the Perricone'O case. In re Vasko'7 resulted in a court order for the removal
of an eye when it was shown that the child's life depended upon it. Corrective
surgery on a child's leg having a progressive deformity was ordered in In re
Rotkowitz' s where the evidence established little doubt of success in the opera-
tion. On still another occasion, a Texas court ordered a harmless treatment for
arthritis.'0
Decisions in which the courts have refused to override the parents include
equally varied circumstances.20 In re HudsoiP1 was a case in which the court
refused to order the amputation of an arm which was as large as the rest of the
child's body and which would thereby prevent normal activity. There was
divergent medical evidence upon the ultimate effect of no operation, and it was
established that an operation would involve an appreciable risk of death. Courts
12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Reynolds v. United States,
supra note 11.
13. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 12; Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. S17,
171 A.2d 140 (1961); McBride v. 'McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 463, 130 A.2d 811 (1957).
14. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 NJ. Eq. 517, 519-20, 123 Ad. 254, 255-56 (CL Err. &
App. 1925); Kessler v. Kessler, 192 N.E.2d 4 (Ind. App. 1963).
15. The courts will not make a determination upon the reasonableness of the religious
belief but they may question whether or not the represented belief is held in good faith.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 7S, 86 (1944).
16. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 M]I 613, 104 N.E.2d 769 (19S2),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. S24 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Karas City CL App.
1952); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
17. 238 App. Div. 12S, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (2d Dept. 1933).
18. 175 Misc. 94S, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Child. CL 1941).
19. Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
20. No case could be found where a court refused to order a medically recommended
blood transfusion for a child. It is somewhat surprising to learn that there is still comider-
able controversy within the medical profession upon the reliability of blood transfubons.
Zeitlin, Blood Transfusion Hazards, 2 Medical Science & Laws 294 (1961). A recent article
on the subject indicates that 1 out of every SO Americans v.ill require a blood tranzfuzion
this year. N. Y. Times, 'Mar. 29, 1964, § 6 (Magazine), p. 3S. Based upon a total popula-
tion of 190 million, that means 2,375,000 Americans will be transfused annually. The
same article points out that the virus of hepatitis is transmitted in about 1 out of every
200 transfusions. Id. at 40. Assuming that each of the 2,375,C perons will receive
only one transfusion, it may accordingly be estimated that some 11,375 perzons vill become
seriously ill or die solely because of contracting hepatitis via blood transfusions thib year.
Over 3,000 more deaths are attributable to transfusions of incompatible blood. Id. at 42.
21. 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
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have refused to order the treatment of rachitis2 2 and speech defects .2 Whether
corrective surgery on a child's cleft palate should be undertaken has been
said to be discretionary with the parents 2 4
It appears that the courts have generally assessed the situation by weighing
the effect upon the child if no treatment is ordered, against the effect if treat-
ment is ordered, giving consideration to the risks of adverse effects and likeli-
hood of success in each instance.25 The religious beliefs of the objecting parents
seem to be accorded little, if any, weight. It is quite clear that an objection
based solely on religious grounds will not impede court action.2 0
Authority dealing with the medical treatment of adults is scant. A 1962 New
York Supreme Court decision held that the courts were without power to order
a transfusion for an elderly Jehovah Witness.27
Dictum of the U.S. Supreme Court indicates that:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves. 28
One commentator has put it this way:
Society and the courts seem to say: 'We are determined that a child shall grow up
safely and in good health to maturity, and we will intervene when his life or health
is threatened by his parents' religious or other eccentricities. But having taken the
trouble so to see him into manhood, why, if he thereafter chooses foolishly to endanger
his own life-and does not at the same time endanger others-then we wash our hands
of him.' 20
It would thus appear that, while the courts have little hesitancy in ordering
the medical treatment of children, they will generally not follow that course
with respect to competent adults. The principal case, however, does not fit
directly in either of these categories; rather it contains elements of each.
It is believed to be the first case in which the highest court of a state has held
22. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (1911). The child had a progressive deformity
of the spine which would seriously interfere with the child's use of his legs. The operation was
a common one although it appeared that there was a large margin of error in medical diag-
nosis and prognosis.
23. In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952).
24. In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955). Although the physician testified
that surgery at an early age was most desirable, it was admitted that the chances of success
in treatment would not be significantly lessened by a lapse of several years, i.e., until the
child was more able to decide for himself what course should be taken.
25. See generally 24 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 642, 644 (1963).
26. See generally 8 Viii. L. Rev. 114, 118 (1962).
27. Erickson v. Dilgard, Civil No. 11974, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County, Oct. 1, 1962.
28. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). The Court gave no indication as
to what would be the "age of full and legal discretion." At common law the age of discretion
was 14 years for a boy, and 16 years for a girl. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 690-91,
126 P.2d 765, 774 (1942).
29. Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 48, 69 (1954).
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that medical treatment may be administered to the parent for the purpose of
saving the child.
Last year a somewhat similar case was decided in the District of Columbia.
A mother of a seven-month old child had a bleeding ulcer and, being a Jehovah
Witness, would not consent to a blood transfusion. The physicians in charge
determined that she would die if blood were not administered to her. Judge
Skelly Wright of the court of appeals, acting by the authority of Rule 62 (g) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,30 reversed the district court judge and
signed an order permitting the administration of blood as the physicians deemed
necessary. Several independent reasons were advanced for the decision but it
is clear that the welfare of the woman's child weighed heavily in the judge's
decision.31 However, the decision in the instant case is more moderate than
that of Judge Wright since the continued life of the child was not dependent
upon that of the mother in the latter situation. The New Jersey court gave
no indication as to whether it would go as far as did Judge Wright. The court
did make it clear, however, that it was not deciding the more difficult question
of whether or not it would order medical treatment necessary to save an adult
only.32
What other course could the court have taken? Once it is decided that a
pregnant mother's failure to accept medical treatment which she knows to be
necessary to the life of the unborn child is a legal wrong, the only decision
left relates to the nature of the remedy. It is quite possible that a criminal
liability would attach to such a situation33 but the court, in providing a pre-
ventive relief, followed the only humane alternative.
30. The relevant portion of the section recognizes the "power of an appellate court or
of a judge or justice thereof to . . .grant an injunction during the pendency of an appeal
or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectivenez3 of the
judgment subsequently to be entered."
31. Application of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1963), petition
for rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Five reasons were advanced. Fiint, the
judge felt that there was a persuasive analogy between the "child cases" and the situation
before him, particularly because the patient was in extremis. Second, the patient's refusal
of medical attention was comparable to attempted suicide. Third, by failing to ta:e the
recommended measures to save her own life, the woman was abandoning her child. The
fourth reason set forth was that the patient became a total hospital responsibility by seeking
medical attention. "The final and compelling reason ...was that life hung in the balance."
Id. at 100-09.
32. 42 NJ. at 422, 201 A.2d at 533.
33. In 1901 the daughter of a faith healing father contracted whooping cough and when
this disease was left unattended, pneumonia developed causing the girl's death. The father,
who had refused to call a doctor, was convicted under Section 233 of the Nov York Penal
Code (now N.Y. Pen. Law § 432). The New York Court of Appeals rejected the argument
that the father's faith justified his violation of the statute. People v. Pier-on, 176 N.Y. 201,
6S N.E. 243 (1903). The New Jersey Supreme Court has indicated a contrary view, how-
ever. See the discussion of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-1.1 (1960) in State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463,
181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
Section S1 of the New York Penal Law provides that "a pregnant woman, who ... uses
1964]
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It is new to our law that the state's interest in a child extends to overruling
the parent's decision as to what care the parent is to receive. A pattern of
judicial thought may be discernible. It seems that the state will interfere with
the parent's decision as to his own welfare if, in the eyes of the courts, that
decision unreasonably threatens the welfare of the child. As the decision by
Judge Wright indicates, this protection of the child may extend beyond life-or-
death situations to the mere preservation of parental care. Quite obviously the
adult's right of self-determination is infringed but whether or not this infringe-
ment can be justified will depend upon the restraint used by the courts in the
application of this new proposition of law.
Constitutional Law-New York Procedure for Determining the Voluntari-
ness of a Confession Declared Unconstitutjonal.--Petitioner was tried for
murder in the first degree. His confession was introduced in evidence, without
objection by his counsel. Counsel did, however, question the circumstances
under which petitioner was interrogated. The conviction was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals.' A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in
the Federal District Court, urging that the conviction be set aside because
the confession was involuntary and the New York procedure for determining
the voluntariness of a confession is unconstitutional. The writ was denied,2
and the court of appeals affirmed. 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 to
consider the constitutional question presented. The Supreme Court reversed,
overruled Stein v. New York,5 and held the New York procedure unconstitu-
tional. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
The Supreme Court has held that it will reverse a conviction if it finds as a
matter of law that a confession introduced at the trial was coerced, regardless
of submits to the use of any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to produce her
own miscarriage, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, or that of the child
whereof she is pregnant, is punishable by imprisonment" for one to four years. The limited
number of cases dealing with the statute give no indication as to whether the "other
means" referred to would include passive measures. Moreover, it is doubtful that the de-
fendant had the requisite intent. Her primary reason for refusing transfusions was that
her religious scruples so dictated. The mere fact that the same effect would probably be
obtained seems to provide little basis for saying that it was intended.
1. People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 780, 177 N.E.2d 59, 219 N.Y.S.2d 621 (memorandum
decision), remittitur amended, 10 N.Y.2d 816, 178 N.E.2d 234, 221 N.Y.S.2d $21, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 949 (1961).
2. 206 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
3. United States ex rel. Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962).
4. Jackson v. Denno, 371 U.S. 967 (1963). In his dissent to the instant case, Mr.
Justice Clark argued that the question of the validity of the New York procedure was
not properly before the Court since there had been no objection made to the admissibility
of the confession. Petitioner's counsel questioned the weight to be given the statements,
and not their admissibility. 378 U.S. 368, 423 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
5. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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of the weight or sufficiency of other evidence adduced.0 The procedure used to
determine the admissibility of confessions has, therefore, a substantial effect
on defendant's rights.
There are three procedures used by state courts to determine the voluntari-
ness of a confession: the New York rule, the 'Massachusetts rule, and the
orthodox or Wigmore rule. Under the New York procedure, the trial judge
can exclude the confession only if, as a matter of law, it was coerced.7 If there
is a question of fact, the confession may be admitted and the final determination
of its voluntariness left to the jury.s The New York rule does not require the
judge to absent the jury while he hears evidence on the coercion issueP and
possibly he is not allowed to do so.10
In jurisdictions following the Massachusetts procedure the judge hears all
the evidence concerning voluntariness, 11 resolves the issues of fact, and decides
whether the confession was coerced or not. Only those found to be voluntary
are submitted to the jury, which also considers the issue of voluntariness, with
the instruction that it must entirely disregard the confession if found to be
coerced."-
Under the orthodox rule the judge makes the sole determination of volun-
tariness for purposes of admissibility; the jury considers voluntariness only
as affecting the weight or credibilty of the confession.13
6. E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960); Payne v. Arlanas, 356
U.S. 560, 567-63 (1953); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945).
7. People v. Weiner, 24S N.Y. 11S, 161 N.E. 441 (1923).
S. People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 416-17, 159 N.E. 379, 381-S2 (1927).
9. People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 54, S5 N.E. S09, S12 (1903); People v. Kent, 41
Misc. 191, 33 N.Y. Supp. 943 (1903).
10. United States ex rel. Ricco v. LaVallee, 225 F. Supp. 273, 231-S2 (N.D.N.Y. 1964);
People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 159, 37 N.E. 112, 116-17 (1909) (dictum).
11. In some jurisdictions the practice is to hold the preliminary hearing outside the
presence of the jury. E.g., Presley v. State, 224 MId. 550, 163 A.2d 510 (1961), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 957 (1962); Hall v. State, 223 Mld. 158, 162 A.2d 751 (19t0); Wlliams
v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, 226 P.2d 9S9 (1951); Wood v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 364,
116 P.2d 723 (1941). In at least one jurisdiction, however, the court has the dcrction
to hold the hearing in or out of the presence of the jury. State v. Tasslello, 39 N.J. 232,
291, 133 A.2d 406, 411 (1963); State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 530, 592, 166 A.2d 567, 573
(1960).
12. The appendices to Mr. Justice Black's opinion list the jurisdictions which appear
to follow the Massachusetts procedure as Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii,
Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, O"laboma, Rhode
Island. 378 U.S. at 417-20 (separate opinion). In many cases it is difficult to tell which of
the two procedures is being followed. Both the majority opinion (373 U.S. at 37S-79 n.9)
and the dissent (373 U.S. at 436-37 n.7) point this out.
13. "The admissibility of a confession is determined by the trial judge and not the
jury. The effect of the confession is to be determined by the jury after it has bezen held
by the trial judge to be admissible." State v. Wilson, 217 La. 470, 435, 46 So. 2d 738, 743-44
(1950); 3 Wigmore, E,idence § 361 (3d ed. 1940).
The chance of a coerced confession reaching the jury seems to be slightest under the
orthodox rule. Oddly enough, however, only under the orthodox procedure is it pom-ble
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In Stein, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there were uncertainties
in the New York procedure since a general verdict of innocence or guilt is
rendered with no separate decision on the coercion issue. The Court, neverthe-
less, upheld this procedure by making alternative hypotheses: either the jury
found the confession voluntary and properly relied on it; or it found the confes-
sion coerced, ignored it, and convicted on the weight of other evidence. 14
The Court, in the instant case, attacked both these hypotheses. With regard
to the former, the majority questioned two necessary assumptions: that the
jury found against the defendant on the issues of fact relating to voluntariness,
and that the finding was proper if it was made.'6 As for the latter hypothesis,
the Court cast doubt on the assumed capacity of the jury to disregard a con-
fession found to be coerced where other evidence indicates the defendant's
guilt.16
It should be noted that all the assumptions which the majority declared un-
sound follow from the presumption that juries follow the instructions of the
court. The authority for this assumption is overwhelming.' 7
for a jury to consider a confession involuntary and, finding it credible on the basis of
other evidence, still properly use it as a basis for conviction. Burton v. State, 107 Ala.
108, 130, 18 So. 284, 290 (1895), overruled on another point, Amos v. State, 123 Ala.
50, 26 So. 524 (1899).
The appendices to Mr. Justice Black's opinion list the jurisdictions which appear to
follow the orthodox or Wigmore rule: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. 378 U.S.
at 411-14 (separate opinion).
14. 346 U.S. at 177-78. In the instant case, the Court emphasized that the Stein
Court admitted that a general verdict handicapped petitioner on appeal, since he does
not know what to attack on appeal, and has no assurance that a compromise verdict was
not reached with different jurors treating the confession differently. 378 U.S. at 380.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), held that because of the introduction of
a confession, found by the Supreme Court to be involuntary, "the judgment of convic-
tion will be set aside even though the evidence apart from the confession might have
been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict." Id. at 404. Petitioner is not left in doubt
as to the proper ground for appeal, because he may appeal on both possibilities--intro-
duction of a coerced confession and insufficient evidence-and if he wins on either the
conviction will be set aside.
It should be noted that the Massachusetts procedure, which the Court in the Instant
case stated was constitutional, provides no protection against compromise verdicts,
15. 378 U.S. at 381.
16. Id. at 388-89.
17. E.g., Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 367, rehearing denied, 372
U.S. 950 (1963); Delli Paoli v. United States) 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957); United States
v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617, 636 (7th Cir. 1960); Donaldson v. United States, 248 F.2d 364,
367 (9th Cir. 1957); State v. Carito, 23 Conn. Supp. 302, 305, 182 A.2d 343, 345 (1962);
State v. Ingle, - Wash. -, -, 392 P.2d 442, 448 (1964). However, the Supreme Court
has long held that under certain circumstances jurors are unable to set aside preconceived
opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the accused formed by prejudicial news media.
E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
See generally Comment, Trial by Newspaper, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 61 (1964). Viewing
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It may be argued that an objective appraisal of the jury system demands an
acknowledgment of the existence of certain irregularities.18 However, such a
viewpoint should not be a basis for attacking the very foundation of the jury
system. The majority's denial of the jury's ability to follow the court's instruc-
tions constitutes such an attack. It appears that the Court has written the first
chapter of a revision of American law concerning the jury system.
The Court also stated that the failure in Stein to question the reliability
of the jury's findings was not an oversight but a natural consequence of the
premise underlying that opinion that the sole reason for excluding coerced
confessions is their untrustworthiness.' 0 It follows from this premise, the Court
continued, that those confessions which are true need not be rejected, and
that evidence concerning the truth of the confession and the guilt of the
accused is relevant to the coercion issue.20 Since such a conclusion w~ould be
contrary to present law, the Court in the instant case considered this an impor-
tant ground for overruling Stein.
It would appear that the Court, in drawing these conclusions, misinterpreted
Stein. The Stein Court's rationale for excluding coerced confessions had no
bearing on its acceptance of jury reliability. The Court, in Stein, accepted the
jury's reliability because it assumed that juries are willing and able to follow
the instructions of the court. Also, the majority's conclusion that Stcin's
erroneous "premise" will infect the jury2 ' is illogical. The jury is not instructed
as to the reason for excluding confessions-thus creating the possibility that
the rationale will effect the jury's findings. On the contrary, the jurors are
dearly instructed that even if they find the confession to be true they must find
it voluntary before they may use it3-
The Court also stated that the Massachusetts procedure does not deprive the
the instant decision against that background, it seems quite possible that the Court may
next attack the jury's ability to disregard a confession inadmissible against a co-defendant.
1S. See, e.g., Sorensen, Compromise Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 37 Neb. L. Revs
S02 (195S).
19. 378 U.S. at 383. The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its reasoning for
excluding coerced confessions. Compare Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 563 (1961) and
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), v.ith Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (19C0)
and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). The instant case gives untrustworthines as
one of the reasons for exclusion. 373 U.S. at 333.
20. The Court in the instant case quoted various passages from the Stein opinion
in an attempt to substantiate this statement. 373 U.S. at 3S4 & n.11. Only one of the
passages, however, could be "construed to mean that the truth of a confeson i a
factor in determining its voluntariness, and this was dictum. "If in open court, free from
violence or threat of it, defendants had been obliged to admit incriminating facts, it might
bear on the credibility of their claim that the same facts were admitted to the police only in
response to beating." 346 U.S. at 175. This quotation comes from a discussion of the
effect of cross-examination if the defendant took the stand to testify regarding volun-
tariness.
21. 378 U.S. at 386-S7.
22. See the charges in Stein, 346 US. at 173-74 n.17, and in the instant case,
373 U.S. at 425 (dissenting opinion).
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accused of due process, as does the New York procedure, because "the jury does
not hear all confessions where there is a fair question of voluntariness, but
only those which a judge actually and independently determines to be voluntary,
based upon all of the evidence." 23 How clear is this distinction and what is its
importance? The majority opinion stated that under the New York rule the
trial judge may only exclude a confession "if in no circumstances could the
confession be deemed voluntary." 24 Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent, however,
stated that the New York rule "requires the trial judge 'to reject a confession if
a verdict that it was freely made would be against the weight of the evidence.' "25
The disparity between the majority opinion and the dissent is understandable
since the New York Court of Appeals has not been completely clear on this point.
It must be assumed that there is a practical difference between a confession
being coerced as a matter of law and a holding that it would be against the
weight of the evidence if the jury found the confession voluntary. The New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Randazzio2N stated that "if there is no
conflict in the evidence . . . the question of the admission of confessions is
for the court, but if there is a conflict the question ultimately is for the jury." 27
Similarly, the court held in People v. Doran,28 "When ... an issue of fact is
raised by conflicting testimony, the confession may be admitted and the question
left to the jury whether it were the voluntary statement of the defendant."2 0
In People v. Weiner,3" the court seemed to treat the two phrases as if they were
synonymous: "If the evidence shows without dispute that the confession was
extorted by force or fear or if a verdict that it was freely made would be clearly
against the weight of evidence, the judge should reject it."31
In People v. Leyra,32 from which the dissent quoted,88 the court's holding
covered only the situation where there is no doubt. "[U] nder the circumstances
here disclosed, the trial court should have so determined [that the confession
was coerced] as a matter of law .... '34 The court then stated in dictum that
the judge should exclude confessions if a finding that they were voluntary would
be against the weight of evidence.85 It would appear that the language em-
ployed by the majority in the instant case was more accurate than that used
by the dissent.
In questioning the distinction between the New York and Massachusetts pro-
23. 378 U.S. at 378 n.8 (dictum).
24. Id. at 377.
25. Id. at 428 (dissenting opinion), quoting from People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353,
362, 98 N.E.2d 553, 558 (1951).
26. 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909).
27. Id. at 156, 87 N.E. at 115.
28. 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927).
29. Id. at 416-17, 159 N.E. at 381-82.
30. 248 N.Y. 118, 161 N.E. 441 (1928).
31. Id. at 122, 161 N.E. at 443.
32. 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
33. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
34. 302 N.Y. at 362, 98 N.E.2d at 558.
35. Ibid.
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cedures, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that "since it is only the exclusion of a con-
fession which is conclusive under the Massachusetts rule, it is likely that where
there is doubt-the only situation in which the theoretical difference between
the two rules would come into play-a trial judge will resolve the doubt in
favor of admissibility, relying upon the final determination by the jury.":
Such a statement, however, is pure conjecture; Mr. justice Harlan's labeling
of differences in the procedures as "nice theoretical distinctions"37, seems
inaccurate. There is, in fact, an important distinction between the two proce-
dures because more damaging confessions can reach the jury under the New
York procedure than under the Massachusetts. However, this will entail a
deprivation of defendant's rights only if it is assumed that the jury will not,
or cannot, ignore a confession which it finds coerced. Such an assumption runs
counter to the tenets of the jury system, and should not be accepted. As
Mr. Justice Harlan stated, "the Court has repeatedly rejected 'speculation that
the jurors disregarded dear instructions of the court in arriving at their ver-
dict,' ... as a ground for reversing a conviction or, a fortiori, as the reason for
adopting generally a particular trial practice." 3
Mr. Justice Black, in his opinion, pointed out that the majority opinion left
unanswered an important question.30 Under New York procedure the prosecu-
tion has the burden of proving to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the confession was voluntary.4° Does the new rule impose the same burden on
the state when the judge is making the determination, or may the judge
"decide voluntariness merely on a preponderance of the evidence?" 41 If the
latter situation prevails, the defendant would seem to have lost some protection
previously afforded him, especially since the jury will now get the confession
with the "judge's explicit or implicit stamp of approval on it.'
36. 378 U.S. at 43S (dissenting opinion).
37. Ibid.
33. Id. at 430 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis omitted.) "[T]he Court's constant refusal
in the past to accept as a rationale for decision the dangers of jury incompetence or
waywardness ... demonstrate[s] the lack of constitutional foundation for its decion. '
Id. at 436 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. 378 U.S. at 405 (separate opinion).
40. People v. Rogers, 192 N.Y. 331, 346, 85 N.E. 135, 140 (1903) (dictum). The
Court discussed the rule that a confession is considered voluntary, and therefore ad-
missible, until the accused comes forward with evidence to show that the confemon
was coerced. This is the rule followed in Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Congdon,
265 Mass. 166, 174, 165 N.E. 467, 470 (1928); Commonwealth v. Culver, 126 Bass.
464, 465 (1879); Commonwealth v. Sego, 125 Mlass. 210, 213 (1878).
In most jurisdictions the prosecution has the burden of making a preliminary -howing
that the confession was voluntary. E.g., State v. Tassiello, 39 N.J. 232, 183 A.2d 405
(1963); State v. Hudson, S9 Ariz. 103, 358 P.2d 332 (1960).
The jurisdictions following the New York procedure concerning admi-bility do not
all follow the same rule regarding the burden of making a prima facie case. The rame
is true of the jurisdictions following the Massachusetts procedure.
41. 378 U.S. at 405 (separate opinion).
42. Id. at 404 (separate opinion).
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The appendices to Mr. Justice Black's opinion list other jurisdictions which
appear to follow the New York procedure.4 3 Virtually all the cases cited, how-
ever, are distinguishable from the New York cases in that the preliminary
hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. Despite this difference,
the Supreme Court has treated these cases similarly. On the same day that
the instant case was decided, in memorandum decisions refering to it the
Supreme Court vacated convictions in eleven other cases. 44 In at least one
of them4 5 the procedure followed was to have the preliminary hearing outside
the presence of the jury.46 Hence, it would appear that all recent convictions
in those jurisdictions following the New York rule will be vacated if they may
have been based on a confession whose voluntariness was a question of fact.
An important question to be considered is the effect of the instant case on
prisoners heretofore convicted under the New York procedure. Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his dissent, suggested that the holding would be applied retro-
actively. 47 This is an area in which there is authority on both sides of the
question. In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.,48 the Supreme Court retro-
actively applied Griffin v. Illinois,40 which held that the failure to furnish a trial
transcript at the State's expense was a denial of due process, where state law
required that an indigent petitioner submit a transcript with his appeal. In
Doughty v. Maxwell,50 the Court appeared to retroactively apply Gideon v.
Wainwright,5 1 which held that a denial of a defendant's right to counsel was a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The question is still open, however,
whether Mapp v. Ohio, 2 which held that evidence obtained by illegal search
and seizure is inadmissible in a state court as it is in a federal court, is to be
applied retroactively. Many lower court decisions can be found holding each
way.53
43. 378 U.S. at 414-17 (separate opinion). The jurisdictions are Arkansas, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
44. The cases are collected in 378 U.S. at 562-75. The jurisdictions affected are Arizona,
District of Columbia, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
45. Commonwealth v. Senk, 412 Pa. 184, 194 A.2d 221 (1963), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Senk v. Pennsylvania, 378 U.S. 562 (1964) (per curiam).
46. 412 Pa. at 189, 194 A.2d at 224, n.1.
47. 378 U.S. at 440 (dissenting opinion).
48. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
49. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
50. 376 U.S. 202 (1964) (per curiam).
51. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In the recent case of United States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d
303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964), the court stated that if Gideon
had left any doubt as to its retroactive application, Doughty v. Maxwell, supra note 50,
conclusively answered it in the affirmative. 330 F.2d at 307. Dissenting to the denial
of certiorari however, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that he did not think the question
of Gideon's retroactivity had been fully considered by the Court. 378 U.S. at 998.
52. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
53. Applied retroactively, e.g., California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1963); Hall
v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); United
States ex rel. Eastman v. Fay, 225 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Contra, e.g., United
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It may be argued that the Supreme Court applied both Eskridge and
Gideon retroactively because of a fear that innocent persons have been con-
victed because of a denial of their constitutional rights. In Mapp, however,
the Court was not concerned with exclusion of evidence that is inherently
unreliable, whose admission might endanger innocent people; the purpose of
the holding was to discourage unconstitutional searches in the future. Although
the Court in the instant case argued that Stc was wrong in stating that
coerced confessions are inadmissible solely because of their untrustworthiness, 4
the Court admitted :5 that it was one of the reasons for exclusion. Because of
the danger that innocent people may have been convicted through use of coerced
confessions it has been suggested that restrictions on their admission be made
retroactive.56 If the Supreme Court follows this reasoning then the new rule
will require retroactive application.
Whatever the application, the decision does not require a new trial for the
defendant or, it seems, any other prisoner relying on this decision. What the
Court required was a hearing in the state court to determine the coercion
issue, "in a proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt or inno-
cence." 7 Only if it is determined at this hearing that the confession was
coerced is the prisoner entitled to a new trial (without the introduction of
the confession); otherwise, the conviction stands.c This disposition has, at
least, the advantage of reducing the state's burden of retrying defendants
whose trial comes within the proscription of the present case.
Constitutional Law-Right of Attorney Defending Indigent Prisoner
to Compensation Under the Fifth Amendment Upheld.--Attorney, ap-
pointed by a federal court to defend an indigent prisoner, was permitted by the
court to petition against the United States to recover for his time and e.penses on
the theory that such was a "taking" for a "public use" and that under the fifth
amendment such taking without compensation was unconstitutional. The court
found that, although there were no prior federal holdings that this power was
in the realm of the judiciary, it could still grant compensation, since a denial
States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963); Louisiana ex rel. Miles v.
Walker, 222 F. Supp. 975 (EI). La. 1963); People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 .E2d
99, 227 N.Y.S.2d 421, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 850 (1962), petition for rehearing denied, 372
U.S. 961 (1963). See Comment, Collateral Post-Conviction Remedies Available to New
York State Prisoners, 32 Fordham L. Rev. S03, 821-22 (1964).
54. 378 U.S. at 383.
55. Id. at 3S5-86.
56. "[A]lthough one purpose of the coerced confession rule-to deter future coercion-
might not be furthered either by general or selective retroactive application, another
purpose of the rule-to assure that no person is punished on the basis of such in-
herently unreliable evidence-might well be served by either general or selective retro-
active application." Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 Yale LJ. 907, 943 (1962).
57. 378 U.S. at 394.
58. Ibid.
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of same would be violative of petitioner's constitutional rights. Dillon v. United
States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
Nabb v. United States,' the only federal case on point, is in line with the
majority view held by the state courts that in the absence of statute, an attorney
assigned to defend an indigent prisoner cannot recover judgment from the
public. The Nabb court rejected the idea that the guarantee to the accused of
assistance of counsel implies a guarantee of compensation to the appointed
attorney.
During the nineteenth century it was the prevalent view that it was a poor
lawyer indeed who would think of payment when honored by court appoint-
ment to defend a pauper.2 In our century, while most states have recognized
the wisdom of compensating counsel, only three have decided that it is in the
province of the judiciary to remedy the situation.3 The courts of Utah, fierce
exponents of the majority view, have expanded on the older view that attorneys
can be made to serve gratuitously because they are licensed by the state4 and
have held that lawyers, as officers of the court, hold their position "cum onere"
and that it is one of the burdens of office to serve indigents without compensa-
1. 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864).
2. In Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99, 105 (1879), the court stated: "To hold that
counsel, appointed to defend insolvent prisoners, may demand compensation from the
county, would be a departure from a time-honored custom to the contrary, and It Is
not difficult to foresee the mischief to which it would lead. It is far better to let such cases
rest on the foundation which has hitherto sustained them: human sympathy and a Just
sense of professional obligation." See also 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 700 & n.4
(8th ed. 1927), where he states: "But we think a court has a right to require the service,
whether compensation is to be made or not; and that counsel who should decline to
perform it, for no other reason than that the law does not provide pecuniary compensation,
is unworthy to hold his responsible office in the administration of justice."
3. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854); Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa
1850); Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 (1859).
4. Accord, Presby v. Klickitat County, 5 Wash. 329, 31 Pac. 876 (1892). Contra, Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232 (1957); Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964); Knox County
Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940). In the Instant
case the court commented: "It needs only to be stated that today, if one holds the prescribed
qualifications, he must be admitted to practice before that court as a matter of right,
and the attorney, having once acquired that license, can only be deprived of it through
the judicial exercise of due process." 230 F. Supp. at 493. In Knox the court refuted the
older view commenting: "The Legislature may in the future require the licensing of restau-
rant operators and grocers as a sanitary police measure. If a law should be enacted requiring
every person licensed by the state to render services, or furnish the materials of their
business, to paupers gratuitously, much difficulty would be found in justifying a
decision holding the law unconstitutional as depriving the green grocer or the restaurant
operator of his goods, or as depriving the physician, or the barber, or the plumber, or the
electrician, or the mechanical engineer of his services without compensation, while adhering
to a rule that licensed attorneys' services may be taken without compensation." 217 Ind.
at 510, 29 N.E.2d at 412.
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tion.5 The courts maintaining the majority view often quote provisions in the
various attorney's oaths, a common one reading: "I will never reject, from any
consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or
delay any man's cause for lucre or malice."0 This line of reasoning suggests that
even if an attorney's appointment is compulsory, as is the case in Utah, he
still is not being deprived of property without license of law.
As stated above, the minority view, adopted by the present court, has pre-
viously been followed only by the courts of Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin.
Indiana is the leading exponent of this view as the latter states now regulate
the attorneys' compensation by statute.7 The Indiana courts have based their
reasoning on three factors: (1) the wording of the state constitution that "no
man's particular services shall be demanded without just compensation,"3 and
that therefore an attorney cannot be compelled, under threat of disbarment
or other sanctions against him, to defend a pauper at his own expense; (2) the
provision of the sixth amendment that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."; (3) the inherent
power of the court to order the payment of all e.xpenses " 'necessary for the
holding of court and the administration of its duties? '* It was pointed out
that "in order to conduct a legal trial, the court must have power to appoint
counsel, and order that such counsel shall be compensated if necessary; and that
the right to provide compensation cannot be made to depend upon the will of
the Legislature.. . ."10 Such reasoning might also be used in a federal case in
the light of the fifth and sixth amendments.
XWhile there is no federal case on point in agreement with the instant court,
the holding is not without substantial foundation. In United States v. Lyna~l6
the Court held that "when the government appropriates property which it does
not claim as its own it does so under an implied contract that it will pay the
value of the property it so appropriates."'-' This Court recognized the distinc-
tion between a proprietory and a governmental right, the former entailing the
appropriation of property which the government claims as its own and the
latter providing for the appropriation of property, not its own but which it
may confiscate under the right of eminent domain. That property falling into
the latter category is, under the fifth amendment, subject to compensation. In
Nattress v. United States13 the court stated that "private property is not to be
S. Ruckenbrod . Mullins, 102 Utah 543, 133 P.2d 325 (1943); Pardee v. Salt Lahe
County, 39 Utah 4S2, 113 Pac. 122 (1911).
6. ABA, Oath of Admission. (Emphasis omitted.)
7. Iowa Code § 775.5 (1962); Wis. Stat. § 256.49 (1961).
S. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 11, 12 (1854), citing Ind. Const. art. I, § 21.
9. Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 511, 29 NX.E2d 40s,
413 (1940), quoting 14 Am. Jur. Courts § 171 (193S). See also Strobbar v. Dwinne, 29 F.2d
915 (5th Cir. 1929).
10. Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, supra note 9, at S12, 29 N.E.2d
at 413.
11. 1S3 U.S. 445 (11902).
12. Id. at 464.
13. 186 F. Supp. 1S0 (D.N,I., 1960).
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lightly regarded, and the sovereign should be held to a strict accountability for
any taking thereof .... ,,14 United States v. Certain Property Located in the
Borough of Manhattan,15 held that "just as the Government's interest 'in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done' . . . so its interest as a taker in eminent domain is to pay 'the full and per-
fect equivalent in money of the property taken' . . . neither more nor less-not
to use an incident of its sovereign power as a weapon with which to extort a
sacrifice of the very rights the Amendment gives."' 16 The definition of compen-
sable property under the right of eminent domain has been extended to patents"
and liens 18 and the present court joined the courts of Indiana in extending it to
the labor of a lawyer.' 9
Had Congress remained inactive in this area, the effect of the instant case
would have been to remedy an unfortunate and deteriorating situation. The
injustice of the present system of non-compensation has affected the indigent
as well as his counsel, so much so that it is questionable whether the mandate of
the sixth amendment is being fulfilledY In a recent study conducted by the
Harvard Law Review2 ' it was found that unpaid counsel, who must sacrifice time
and money to appear at trial, have an interest in encouraging pleas of guilty in
order to cut down on expenses. It also would seem that courts are loathe to call
on lawyers of high stature who would tend to lose a great deal of money if they
were to serve without compensation.2 2 The courts, therefore, tend to call upon
young and inexperienced lawyers who all too often gain their experience at the
expense of their clients. 23
14. Id. at 183.
15. 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962).
16. Id. at 452-53.
17. United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
18. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
19. The court commented: "If the work product of an inventor or a laborer claiming a
lien be compensable property, so is the work product of a lawyer, and his office expenses
and out-of-pocket money are such, per se." 230 F. Supp. at 492. See also plaintiff's argument
in Presby v. Klickitat County, 5 Wash. 329, 331, 31 Pac. 876, 877 (1892) where, relying on
the Indiana holdings it was maintained that: "To compel attorneys at law to render services
gratuitously is, in effect, to cast a burden or to levy a tax upon them not borne by citizens
engaged in any other profession or business; and that it is the taking of the time and labor-
in other words, the property-of counsel without compensation, and without due process of
law, all of which is in violation of the fundamental law of the state."
20. See Lumbard, Better Lawyers For Our Criminal Courts, The Atlantic, June, 1964,
p. 86; Time, Aug. 7, 1964, p. 56. But see Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 16, 20 (8th Cir.
1960), where it was held that the "requirement is met whenever the accused is supplied
counsel who exercises that judgment which might be expected of one trained in the law and
committed to the diligent application of its principles."
21. Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 597-98 (1963).
22. For specific examples of injustices which can arise from the present system see Ervin,
Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435
(1963). See also 108 Cong. Rec. 22256 (1962) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
23. It is perhaps for this reason that a poll taken by the Harvard Law Review of the
United States District Judges and United States Attorneys showed a vast majority in favor
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It, therefore, is submitted that the holding of the instant case is not an
example of the usurpation of power by the judiciary but is rather a filling of
a void left by the inaction of Congress. Ironically, less than two months after
the decision in the instant case, Congress passed the very legislation needed
to alleviate the problems set forth above,24 legislation, which, had it been
enacted previously would have obviated the need for this litigation. It is now
to be hoped that this legislation will solve the problems which this decision
has created; for example, the measure of compensation to which the attorney
is entitled.
Corporations-Fraud on Court Approving Derivative Suit Settlement Not
Chargeable to Nonparticipating Director.--Defendant directors were ac-
cused in a derivative action of purchasing securities from the corporation's port-
folio at a price well below actual value. After extensive hearings, a settlement of
the suit was approved by a New York court.' Subsequently, earnings projec-
tions were found in the company's files which, although requested at the settle-
ment hearings, had not been produced. The projections were shown to have been
of abolishing the present system of non-compensation. The actual figures were 82% in favor
of change, 8% against change, 105 undecided. Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 605-06 (1963).
24. Criminal justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 85-455, SSth Cong., 2d Ses. (August 20,
1964). This act provides a plan for the representation of indigent prisoners charged in
federal courts with felonies or misdemeanors. The plan may be accepted in its entirety or it
may be supplemented by the judicial councils of the several circuits. Barring a waiver by
the accused, representation is provided at every stage of the judicial proceeding. The ap-
pointed attorney or the bar association or legal aid agency which provides him vill be
compensated "at a rate not exceeding 15 per hour for time expended in court or before
a United States commissioner, and $10 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court,
and shall be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred."
1. This is something of an oversimplification. Originally ten derivative suits were brought
in the New York Supreme Court and others were brought in the federal courts. The state
suits were consolidated under the caption Zenn v. Anzalone, Civil No. 7244, N.Y. Sup. CL, June
23, 1954 and general counsel was appointed to handle both federal and state actions. After
settlement negotiations in these suits had begun, certain shareholders who had been excluded
from the proceedings obtained an injunction in the district court prohibiting Wre of any
settlement arrived at as a defense in further proceedings by them. Bresrwick & Co. v. Brigs,
135 F. Supp. 397 (S-D._.Y. 1955). The New York Supreme Court adjudicated the settle-
ment arrived at in the proceedings before it as "fair and reasonable," but delayed entering
a final order until the federal injunction might be lifted. Zenn v. Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d S97,
191 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1954). The federal court appointed the referee in the state court
proceedings as a special master to consider an application to lift its injunction, but declined
to concur in his favorable report. Subsequent renegotiations raised the settlement to aboutQ3,000,000. At that point the federal court withdrew its injunction. The state court order
was modified to include this amount, and judgment entered. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby,
333 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1964). The instant court concentrated on the collateral attack
upon the state proceedings. It is not entirely clear why some comment was not made upon
the nondisclosure in the federal court.
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
in the possession of two of the directors at that time.2 The corporation, in an
action against a third director and others who, although included in the settle-
ment, had not taken part in the hearings, sought, in the United States District
Court, to have the judgment set aside for fraud. 3 On appeal from a judgment
for the defendant, the court of appeals, in affirming, held that a director could
not be charged with his co-director's fraudulent concealment of evidence in a
settlement proceeding where the evidence would not at least have probably
changed the result. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964).
Even in the absence of statutory requirements, 4 it has been customary in
New York to submit settlements in derivative actions to the court for approval. 5
Where a judgment is entered upon such a settlement, and all parties have had a
chance to contest the proceedings, it becomes binding upon all shareholders and
cannot be attacked collaterally except for fraud or duress.(
The kind of fraud for which a judgment may be collaterally attacked has been
limited. In Crouse v. McVickar,7 the New York Court of Appeals, following the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Throckmorton,8
held that a judicially approved settlement could not be attacked collaterally on
the basis of "intrinsic" fraud, i.e., fraud going to the merits of the action. The
court noted, however, that fraud in the mode of trying the cause was actionable.
The rationale for the difference was that, although both kinds of fraud were
abhorrent to the law, it was essential that there be a point at which litigation
would terminate in a "solemn judgment."9
2. Four items were allegedly withheld. The most crucial of these was a projection of
earnings enclosed in a letter from the Controller of the company whose stock was purchased
to one of the directors, and which was sent with a notation to yet another of the offending
directors at about the time of the settlement hearings. Judge Moore's opinion does not
indicate that there was a projection among the enclosures. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, supra
note 1, at 330, 337, 339.
3. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
4. Statutory requirements for judicial approval of derivative suit settlements were only
recently introduced in New York with the adoption of the N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(b)
(effective Sept. 1, 1963). Derivative actions in federal courts also require judicial approval
for settlements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c). Such settlements do not bar parties not participating
in the proceedings from asserting a later action on the same cause. Gluck v. Unger, 25 Misc.
2d 554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
5. Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 299 F.2d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N.Y. Supp. 695
(Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd mem. 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N.Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934),
aff'd mem. 266 N.Y. 525, 195 N.E. 183 (1935).
7. 207 N.Y. 213, 100 N.E. 697 (1912).
8. 98 U.S. 61, 66 (1878).
9. 207 N.Y. at 217, 100 N.E. at 697. The authority of the Throckmorton case, supra
note 8, as establishing the federal rule was somewhat diminished by the Court's holding In
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891), which seems diametrically opposed. In Graver v.
Faurot, 64 Fed. 241 (C.C.N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 76 Fed. 257 (7th Cir.), certificate dismissed, 162
U.S. 435 (1896), the Court utilized a technicality to avoid settling the conflict. This situation
evoked the now-famous reaction of one commentator that, "the Supreme Court of the
United States, to show its utter impartiality, has ruled both ways, and left the spectacle of
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The district court in the instant case rested its decision on the ground that
no connection had been shown between the evidence concealed and the de-
fendant, and that even if such a connection had been demonstrated, it would
have established no more than intrinsic fraud.20 Perjury on a trial has long been
regarded as intrinsic in nature,'" and it was reasoned that the failure to produce
evidence upon a trial was of the same species of fraud. This in large part fol-
lowed the reasoning of Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp."'- in which a federal
court held that failure by defendants in a New York derivative suit settlement
to disclose certain relevant corporate opportunities which were wasted, con-
stituted only intrinsic fraud and could not be attacked in the federal courts.
The court of appeals in the instant case declined to consider intrinsic fraudPlC
Of primary concern was whether there was a connection between the defendant
and the withheld evidence as a matter of law.' 4
Two arguments were raised to support such a connection. It is accepted that,
other things remaining constant, the existence of a fact gives rise to an eviden-
tiary inference of its existence at an earlier time.'r In United States v. Con-
solidated Laundries Corp.,10 the defendant in a criminal antitrust prosecution
discovered documents in a file after trial which had not been there when the file
two cases, one of which holds that false evidence is a ground for rever-al, the other that
it is not, both of which have been followed, and neither of which has ever been overruled."
21 Colum. L. Rev. 263, 269 (1921). Whatever the rule in federal case:, Profesor Moore has
suggested that in diversity suits the federal courts should follow the choice of the forum as
to which rule will be applied. 7 Moore, Federal Practice f C0.37[3] (2d ed. 1955). This
course was adopted by the district court in the instant case. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218
F. Supp. 164, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
At least one exception to the intrinsic fraud rule has been recognized in the federal courts.
Following 3 Freeman, Judgments § 1235 (5th ed. 1925), the seventh circuit has noted: " 'The
failure to perform the duty to speak or make disclosures which rests upon one became of
a trust or confidential relation is obviously a fraud for which equity may afford relief from
a judgment thereby obtained, even though the breach of duty occurs during a judicial pro-
ceeding and involves false testimony and this is true whether such fraud be reo-arded as
extrinsic or as an exception to the extrinsic fraud rule.' Ferguson v. Wachs, 96 F.2d 910,
918 (7th Cir. 1933). See Earll v. Picken, 113 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Smith v. Smith,
210 Fed. 947 (D. Mont. 1914), aff'd, 224 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1915). There do not appear to be
any New York rulings on this point. Appellants in the instant case apparently attempted
to rely on such an exception, 333 F.2d at 334, although the court neither considercd the
question, nor did it find a duty to disclose. See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
10. Alleg hany Corp. v. Kirby, 21S F. Supp. at 135.
11. Jacobowitz v. Herson, 263 N.Y. 130, 197 N.E. 169 (1935); Ro s v. Wood, 70 N.Y.
8 (1877); Chenu v. Board of Trustees, 12 App. Div. 2d 422, 212 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Ist Dep't
1961).
12. 299 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
13. 333 F.2d at 336.
14. Id. at 331.
15. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961); Russell, Poling & Co. v. Conners
Standard Marine Corp., 252 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. S. B. Penick & Co,
136 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1943); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 437 (3d ed. 1940).
16. 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
was made available to him in preparing his defense. The court there applied this
rule of inference to establish that the documents ought to have been available
and concluded that their absence was prejudicial. In that case, however, the
court did not go so far as to infer wilfull concealment, as would be required here,
but instead supposed mere negligence. 17 Moreover, as Judge Kaufman's concur-
ring opinion in the instant case pointed out, the new trial in Consolidated
Laundries was granted because of the court's continuing duty to supervise due
process in the administration of criminal justice in federal courts, a duty which
does not extend to the ensuring of perfect justice in civil litigation in state
courts. 18
Judge Friendly's dissent proposed a second theory connecting the immediate
defendant with the nondisclosure. It has been held that conspiring directors may
be liable for damages contemplated by their conspiracy, even though the damag-
ing acts are performed by persons independent of their control. Thus, in Bos-
worth v. Allen," a number of directors, who conspired to sell control of their
company to known looters, were held liable for the acts of their successors,
primarily on the theory that their acts were an intended consequence of the
conspiracy. 20 On this premise, Judge Friendly's dissent postulated that "when
one of a group of fiduciaries accused of illegal self-dealing conceals from a
court facts which pertain to the liability of his associates as well as himself,
a settlement so procured is voidable as to all. A partner for whose benefit
the facts were concealed can no more preserve a settlement thus obtained than
the one who was on the front line." 21 Judge Kaufman agreed.22 This would seem
to parallel decisions which hold that judgments procured as part of an antecedent
scheme to defraud a party will not bar that party from later relief. 3 But the
extension of these cases, and the Bosworth theory, to situations where the
procuring of a fraudulent judgment was no part of an antecedent scheme would
not seem to be without difficulties. In particular, it must be questioned whether
the problem of unfaithful directors has really reached proportions sufficient to
justify an in terrorem policy which would charge a director for unanticipated
acts from which he could not extricate himself, and, indeed, of which he could
well be totally ignorent. 24
The court split widely on the weight of nondisclosed evidence required to
sustain a collateral attack. Judge Moore, reasoning by analogy, concluded that
it should be more than cumulative, and at least of sufficient weight to support
17. Id. at 570.
18. 333 F.2d at 338.
19. 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901).
20. Id. at 168, 61 N.E. at 166.
21. 333 F.2d at 338.
22. Id. at 327.
23. Erbe v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 N.Y.2d 321, 144 N.E.2d 78, 165 N.Y.S.2d
107 (1957); Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N.Y. 211, 153 N.E. 51 (1926); Verplanck v. Van Buren,
76 N.Y. 247 (1879); Oldham v. McRoberts, 37 Misc. 2d 979, 237 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd men. 18 App. Div. 2d 773, 235 N.Y.S.2d 457 (4th Dep't 1962).
24. Judge Friendly's justification was that "such cases will hopefully be rare .... " 333
F.2d at 346.
[Vol. 33
CASE NOTES
a new trial, i.e., such as would probably have changed the result.2 This would
seem to receive some support from the case of Ward v. Town of Soufhfidd,
where it was said that "where fraudulent concealment of a fact is relied upon
for the purpose of impeaching and setting aside a judgment regularly obtained,
it must be an intentional concealment of a material and controlling fact ...
Judge Friendly pointed to two New York cases in which judgments were over-
turned because of the concealment of evidence by fiduciaries where the evidence
was only such as might have changed the result.2 s The cases suggested, however,
do not necessarily carve out an exception applicable to the instant case. Mattcr
of LautzO involved an attempt on the part of a trustee to defraud his individual
cestuis by the concealment of evidence of doubtful weight. Although some
analogy has occasionally been drawn between directors and trustees,- the term
"fiduciary" is not, of itself, a rubric,3' and more than a little doubt may be
entertained in applying to the dealings betweeen a director and his stockholders
the same standards applicable to the face-to-face dealings between a trustee and
his cestiis. Boston & Maine R.R. v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,32 is factually
more appropriate. There, petitioner sought to attack collaterally the appoint-
ment of a receiver for an insolvent railroad on the ground that the attorney who
prosecuted the receivership proceedings concealed from the court the fact that
several years earlier he had, as general counsel for petitioner, obtained a judg-
ment from the same court declaring the "insolvent" corporation a nonentity.
The receivership was part of a scheme to eject petitioner from some of its
properties. It is doubtful that the appellate division, in allowing this attack,
applied the standard suggested by Judge Friendly, for, while the court at one
point said it was only questionable whether the court would have rendered a
judgment without further investigation 33 had it known of the concealed judg-
ment, at another it stated: "It seems to us, therefore, that Mr. Justice
Staley was entitled to a full disclosure to the end that he might not unwit-
25. Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 131 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y 1955).
26. 102 N.Y. 2S7, 6 N.E. 660 (1SS6).
27. Id. at 293, 6 N.E. at 661-62. (Emphasis added.)
28. Boston & Maine R.R. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 233 App. Div. 191, 264 N.Y. Supp.
470 (3d Dep't 1933) ; Matter of Lautz. 12S lisc. 710, 220 N.Y. Supp. 7S2 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
29. Supra note 28.
30. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (195S);
Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1946); Continental Sec. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16, 99
N.E. 138, 141 (1912); People ex rel. Aanice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 201, 94 N.E. 634, 637
(1911); Bosworth v. Alien, 16S N.Y. 157, 165, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901); Sage v. Culver, 147
N.Y. 241, 41 N.E. 513 (1395); Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning Ry., 103 N.Y. 58,
73-74, 3 N.E. 355, 35S (18S6).
31. "But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligation does he owe as a fiduciary? In what
respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his
deviation from duty?" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 313 U.S. S0, 35-6 (1943) (opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter).
32. 233 App. Div. 191, 264 N.Y. Supp. 470 (3d Dep't 1933).
33. Id. at 196, 264 IN.Y. Supp. at 477-78.
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tingly give his judicial sanction to what the Court of Appeals has termed 'the
unseemly spectacle of inconsistent judgments rendered by the same court.' ",84
From this it seems likely that the court felt the nondisclosed judgment would
probably have changed the result.
Having based his decision on the ground that the documents in the instant
case could not be tied to the defendant's personal knowledge, Judge Moore took
up, apparently arguendo and in dictum,35 the proposition that had defendant
had possession of such documents, there would have been an affirmative duty
to come forward in the state proceedings and present them before the court.
That interested directors have the burden of proving the fairness and good
faith of questioned transactions is axiomatic. 30 In Upson v. Otis,87 the court of
appeals for the second circuit utilized this principle in placing upon directors
in settlement proceedings a duty of disclosure with respect to defensive evidence:
Where court approval is asked of a settlement of a suit by beneficiaries against
fiduciaries, far more than a slight indication of doubt as to the likelihood of successful
recovery in full against them is required; for equity closely scrutinizes settlements
between fiduciaries and cestuis, and, were the suit to go to trial, the fiduciaries would
usually bear a heavy burden of proof as to all crucial issues. To justify judicial
sanction of such a settlement, the fiduciaries must make a fairly detailed disclosure of
the evidence which, on a trial, they would use defensively. 38
The court emphasized its determination to adhere to this rule by allowing in full
a claim against a defendant who had not shown a proper defense.
In Heddendorj v. Goldfine,39 disclosure requirements were carried somewhat
further by a district court in Massachusetts which refused to approve a settle-
ment before it until particulars were furnished with regard to certain transac-
tions in spite of the fact that none of the interested parties had questioned the
transactions. The court acted on its own motion as "trustee" for the absent
stockholders. 40
34. Ibid.
35. It is difficult to determine the position of this argument in Judge Moore's opinion.
At the conclusion of the opinion he states: "In the light of the concession by plaintiff's
counsel that he could not tie the financial projections sought to be introduced to Kirby's
personal knowledge, the district court's refusal to speculate or infer that Kirby must have
seen them cannot be characterized as 'clearly erroneous.' In view of this factual finding, It
is unnecessary to consider the district court's alternative conclusion . . . " 333 F.2d at 336.
From this it would seem reasonable to infer that the holding of the court was on a matter
of proof, and not a question of fiduciary duties, the subject of the larger part of his opinion.
36. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. Am.,
8 App. Div. 2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 209 N.E.2d 289
(1960). The cases, however, suggest that such a burden does not arise until some strong
showing of bad faith, as opposed to questionable judgment, has been made. Chelrob Inc.
v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 459-60, 57 N.E.2d 825, 833 (1945); Polhemus v. Polhemus, 114
App. Div. 781, 100 N.Y. Supp. 263 (2d Dep't 1906).
37. 155 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1946).
38. Id. at 614-15.
39. 167 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1958).
40. Id. at 926.
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In large part, the burden of proving the fairness of a settlement is placed
upon directors because it is they who are usually in possession of the relevant
documents and who are intimately acquainted with the questioned transac-
tions. ' Judge Moore, however, noted that there was a balance to be struck
between the right of stockholders to know the facts relevant to I settlement
offered to them, and the right of directors to protect themselves from personal
liability. He pointed especially to the extensive discovery procedures and testi-
mony taken in the instant case as an example of the sort of protection share-
holders enjoy without infringing on such a right. Judge Friendly, however,
observed that the risks and expense of extensive litigation in the "big" case
impel an early, if not altogether favorable, settlement. He further noted that in
such instances, counsel for the defendants and counsel for the settling stock-
holders tend to "gang up" against other shareholders seeking better terms. 3
This situation tended to nullify the effect of the usual adversary devices, and
was a strong argument for imposing an affirmative duty on the directors to come
forward with available evidence. In this regard, it might be noted that the theory
underlying the right of shareholders to bring a derivative action is that wrong-
doing directors will not sue themselves or admit to their wrongful acts. 44 To
require them to bear the burden of proving their own guilt-even to establish
the "fairness" of a proposed settlement-would be a remarkable innovation in
the light of this premise.4a
Fundamentally, the immediate case represents a collision between two policies
of considerable influence. On the one hand, there is the desire of the courts to
protect corporations from the self-dealing of those who have been entrusted
with their management. This desire forms the very basis of the shareholders'
derivative action, 4 6 and underlies the complex of fiduciary obligations imposed
on directors by law.47 Here, the trust imposed upon the Allegheny board was
betrayed not once, but twice. All three members of the court implied the settle-
41. 333 F.2d at 333 (dissenting opinion).
42. Id. at 333.
43. The best example, he pointed out, was the instant case: "[S]tokholders' general
counsel sometimes opposed Graubard's [attorney for stockholders disenting from rettle-
ment] efforts to gain information, although the settlement so igorously defended before
the Referee would have produced less than a quarter as much cash for Alleghany, $70,CZO,
as the 3,0O,000 ultimately secured through the efforts of the attorneys for the plain-
tiffs ... ." 333 F.2d at 347 (dissenting opinion).
44. 333 F.2d at 332. "Directors could not be expected to sue themselves, on behalf of the
Corporation, with any enthusiasm. Even if they wished to, the decisions are against entrust-
ing the conduct of the litigation on a corporation's claim to the directors who would be
held liable if the litigation were successful. They would 'stand in a dual relation which
prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment.' Winkclman v. General Motors Corp., 44
F. Supp. 960, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
45. Judge Moore noted that there is no requirement that a settlement be accompanied by
an admission of guilt, and indeed, observed that settlements are normally accompanied by
vigorous denials of wrongdoing. 333 F.2d at 333.
46. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 2SS, 313-323 (1936); 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations § 5941.1 (1947).
47. See Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 46, at § 990.
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ment in the initial action was somewhat inadequate.48 Judge Friendly philos-
ophized that in view of the extensive control of the defendants over the relevant
evidence, and in view of the dynamics in derivative suits toward an early settle-
ment, the usefulness of such actions in protecting stockholders was limited. 40
In the alternative, he suggested some form of government supervision on corpora-
tion management might be advisable. 50 While there is some appeal to this sugges-
tion in the light of cases like the present, it must be questioned whether, on an
overall view, such a drastic intervention in the domestic affairs of corporate
management has yet been justified. 51 In the absence of such a procedure, how-
ever, Judge Friendly urged that only the most exacting standards of good faith
be accepted from directors seeking to extinguish liability to the corporation.52
On the other hand, it is axiomatic that every case must come to an end. The
bias in favor of the finality of a judgment so prominent in the Throckmorton
and McVickar cases is certainly as appropriate to derivative suits as other
actions. 53 The proceedings in the instant matter have extended over a decade. 4
Against this background, which would seem to evoke the strongest bias in favor
of finality, the plaintiffs were unable to prove actual fraud and were forced to
rely primarily on legal novelties.5 5 From this point of view, it is submitted that
the court could not have reasonably decided other than it did.5 5
48. 333 F.2d at 336 (opinion of Moore, J.) ; id. at 338 (Kaufman, J,, concurring) ; Id. at
342 n.3 (Friendly, J., dissenting). judge Friendly notes: "After receiving an opinion from
counsel that his potential personal liability on the IDS exchange transactions approximated
$22,800,000 and his potential joint liability an additional $39,350,000, computed on a
price of $1,600 per share for the stock acquired for $8.15, plus over $70,000,000 for other
items, he added to the settlement [of $700,000] another $1,000,000 which he estimated would
cost him only $99,000 after taxes .... " 333 F.2d at 343 n.3.
49. Id. at 347.
50. Ibid. He suggested some form of inspection based on the English Companies Act, 1948,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 164, 165(b)(ii), 168, 169(4).
51. Of the reported decisions in state and federal courts in New York during 1963, only
nineteen involved derelictions of duty by directors. See, e.g., Cornfeld v. Eaton, 327 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1963); Walsh and Levine v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 222 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 222 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 319 F.2d
336 (2d Cir. 1963); Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102
(1963); Amdur v. Meyer, 13 N.Y.2d 1089, 196 N.E.2d 63, 246 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1963)
(memorandum decision); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 20 App. Div. 2d 874, 249 N.Y.S.2d 84
(1st Dep't 1963) (memorandum decision).
52. 333 F.2d at 347.
53. Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N.Y. Supp.
655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd mem., 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N.Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934),
aff'd mem. 266 N.Y. 525, 195 N.E. 183 (1935).
54. The first complaints were filed in 1954. 333 F.2d at 328. One of the earlier phases of
these proceedings, Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (D.C.N.Y. 1958) (see note 1 supra)
has been incorporated in a standard work for students for several years. Baker & Cary, Cases
on Corporations 677 (3d ed. 1959).
55. See notes 14-24 supra and accompanying text.
56. The court of appeals has granted a rehearing in the instant case for some time In
October. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1964, p. 24, col. 7.
CASE NOTES
Criminal Law-Family Court Act-Indictment for Felony Assault Upon
Member of Family Will Not Bar Transfer to Family Court.-Defendant
had been indicted by a county court grand jury for an assault in the second
degree upon his wife. Defendant's motion to transfer the proceedings from the
county court to the family court was granted, and the case transferred. The
people appealed on the grounds that the proceedings could not be transferred
since the family court does not have felony jurisdiction and that such a trans-
fer impaired the constitutional function of the grand jury. The appellate divi-
sion dismissed the appeal on the ground that the transfer was not a final order,
and therefore not appealable. However, in its opinion, the court dealt at length
with the merits of the questions raised and concluded that the transfer was valid.
People v. De Jeszs, 21 App. Div. 2d 236, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317 (4th Dep't 1964).
The instant case is one of several in which questions of jurisdiction and proce-
dure under the provisions of the Family Court Act have been raised. Section 812
of the act provides that "the family court has exclusive original jurisdiction,
subject to the provisions of section eight hundred thirteen, over any proceeding
concerning acts which would constitute disorderly conduct or an assault between
spouses . 2..." In defining "exclusive original jurisdiction," the act provides
that the proceeding must be originated in the family court2 in the manner
prescribed therein.3 The act also requires that proceedings, involving family
offenses originated in courts other than the family court, be transferred to
the family court.4
In establishing family offense proceedings the intent of the legislature was to
provide a forum to which an agr ieved family member could bring a com-
plaint, seeldng conciliation rather than criminal prosecution.5 But, if criminal
prosecution is the only feasible alternative, then at the discretion of the family
1. The empowering constitutional section states: "The family court shall have jursdiction
over the following dasses of actions and proceedings which shall be originated in such
family court in the manner provided by law ... and (7) as may be provided by law ...
in conformity with the provisions of section seven of this article, [jurisdiction over crimes
and offenses . .. between spouses .... " N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b).
2. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 114.
3. A proceeding under the act is originated by the filing of a petition alleging the
assault or disorderly conduct, seeking an order of protection or conciliation, or asking that
the proceeding be transferred to a criminal court. N.Y. Family CL Act § 821.
4. "Any criminal complaint charging disorderly conduct or an assault between spouses
.. shall be transferred by the criminal court ... to the family court in the county
in which the criminal court is located . . . ." N.Y. Family CL Act § 313(a).
5. N.Y. Family CL Act § 311 states: "In the past, wives and other members of
the family who suffered from disorderly conduct or assaults by other members of the
family or household were compelled to bring a 'criminal charge' to invoke the jurisdiction
of a court. Their purpose, with few exceptions, was not to secure a criminal conviction
and punishment, but practical help.
"The family court is better equipped to render such help, and the purpose of this
article is to create a civil proceeding for dealing with such instances of disorderly conduct
and assaults. . . . If the family court concludes that these processes are inappropriate
in a particular case, it is authorized to transfer the proceeding to an appropriate criminal
court."
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court judge the proceeding is to be transferred to a criminal court. The Joint
Legislative Committee concluded that the family court should not have criminal
jurisdiction, nor subject offenders to criminal penalties.; Despite this limitation,
the Judicial Conference, discussing the degrees of assault over which the family
court has jurisdiction, stated that "[it] is not limited to any particular degree
of assault."7 The effect apparently intended was to subject all degrees of assault
between family members to the jurisdiction of the family court initially, subject
to a transfer, if required, to the criminal courts.
In People v Klaff,8 the first reported case arising under the Family Court
Act, it appeared that an information had been filed in the District Court,
Nassau County, alleging an act which constituted a felony assault upon the
defendant's wife. The district court exercised jurisdiction, reasoning that the
act was not intended to apply to felony assaults since it failed to provide for
the indictment required in cases of felonies. Further, it said, no provision in
the act guaranteed a prompt hearing or release from detention. 9 The absence of
such provisions, it was suggested, would contravene defendant's right to due
process under the New York Constitution. Upon its own motion, the court
granted a rehearing and affirmed its prior decision to hold the defendant for
the grand jury. The court relied on the dictum in People v. Kaminsky ° that
6. "[I]t would be unwise at this time, to give the Family Court the extensive powers
given the criminal courts under the Penal Law of the State of New York. . . . [Clrimlnal
powers and procedures would be inconsistent with the proper development of the Family
Court, during its formative period, as a special agency for the . . . preservation of the
family." Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization No. 2-Tho
Family Court Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 3430 (McKinney 1962).
7. 8 N.Y. Judicial Conference Ann. Rep. 72 (1963). Compare this language with the
following: "[A] Family Court should have jurisdiction over . . . crimes and offenses,
except felonies . . . between spouses . .. ." 4 N.Y. Judicial Conference Ann. Rep. 89-90
(1959). The comment reflects a change in the original legislative intent. It is noted that the
Governor vetoed S. Int. 2346, N.Y. Leg. 187th Sess. (1964), which proposed to limit the
jurisdiction of the family court to assaults in the third degree.
8. 35 Misc. 2d 859, 231 N.Y.S.2d 875, aff'd on rehearing, 35 Misc. 2d 862, 231 N.Y.S.2d
875 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
9. See N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6, note 30 infra. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 814 was added to
guarantee defendant's rights upon detention, seemingly answering the objection of People
v. Klaff. It reads, "(a) Upon the making of a criminal complaint charging disorderly
conduct or an assault between spouses . . . and until the proceeding is transferred . . . or
dismissed ... the criminal court in which the complaint was made may hold the defendant,
admit to, fix or accept bail or parole the defendant. (b) Upon the making of a decision
to transfer said proceedings to the family court, the said criminal court may hold the
defendant, admit to, fix or accept bail, or parole the defendant for hearing before the
family court."
10. 208 N.Y. 389, 102 N.E. 515 (1913). An eleven-year old's conviction for stealing a
pocketbook, without indictment by grand jury, was held not unconstitutional. The court
there noted particularly that felonies not punishable by death or life imprisonment are
reduced to the grade of misdemeanors if committed by a youth under sixteen years
of age. N.Y. Penal Law § 2186. In Klaff, the court analagously reasoned that the converse
situation, requiring an indictment for a felony, was implied in Kaminsky. It is to be
noted however, that Kaminsky held that a defendant's rights are not impaired when
the grand jury has no function in the case of a non-infamous crime.
1964] CASE NOTES
a defendant cannot be held to answer for a felony n escept upon indictment
by a grand jury.
The concern of the court in Klaff for the defendant's right to be indicted
was misplaced. Though the New York Constitution does require that a de-
fendant not be put in jeopardy of conviction and sentence for a felony without
an indictment' 2-though not for a misdemeanor when the imprisonment
authorized is one year or lessL--it is submitted, however, that since the family
court is without power to confine the defendant as a criminal,14 no indictment
is required prior to family court proceedings. The effect of the order of disposi-
tion, which may be entered in a family offense proceeding, is curative and
conciliatory in scope.15 The order of disposition, being injunctive in nature,
does not involve criminal procedure, and hence defendant's rights would not
be contravened by a family court proceeding, involving an otherwise felonious
act, without an indictment.
In Ricapito v. People'6 defendant sought mandamus and prohibition in the
supreme court to compel the transfer, from the county court to the family
court, of an indictment charging assault in the first degree upon his wife, and
to enjoin further prosecution in the county court. The supreme court declined
11. The terms "infamous crime" and "felony" are synonymous. The Court of Appeals
has stated: "We are justified, therefore, on authority as well as long-continued uage and
practice, in determining that the provisions of the Constitution requiring indictment ...
relate to those crimes where the punishment may be in State's prison or for a longer
term than one year in any prison." People v. Bellinger, 269 N.Y. 265, 271, I9 N.E. 213,
215-16 (1935). The court held that a crime designated a misdemeanor for vhich the centence
authorized could have been two years in prison, or a $SOCO fine, should be treated as a
felony. The Court of Special Sessions was without jurisdiction to try it and the crime
had to be presented by indictment. See also, People v. Schumann, 146 Misc. 39S, 262 N.Y.
Supp. 486 (CL Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1933), where a certificate that a charge be
presented by indictment was granted, when defendant vas prosecuted for the misde-
meanor of conspiracy to rob. Since he could also face a prosccution for robbery, it was
held that the right to he indicted should be exercised. N.Y. Penal Law § 2.
12. In People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 319, 164 N.E. 111, 112 (1923),
the court said: "Article 1, section 6, proceeds far beyond the point of conferring a mere
personal privlege. Unqualifiedly, it prohibits the trial of anyone charged with infamous
crime except on presentment or indictment by a grand jury. Until the grand jury shall
act, no court can acquire jurisdiction to try." The court held that a per-son could not
waive the right to be indicted for a felony, and any conviction in opposition to this
was invalid.
13. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6; People v. Bellinger, 269 N.Y. 265, 199 N.E. 213 (1935).
14. The court may however hold a respondent in contempt for a failure to obey an
order of disposition under section 841 of the act. Under such an event, he may be im-
prisoned for a term not exceeding six months. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § C46.
15. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 841 states: "At the conclusion of a dispositional hearing
on a petition under this article, the court may enter an order (a) dismissing the petition ...
or (b) suspending judgment for a period not in excess of six months; or (c) placing the
respondent on probation ... or (d) making an order of protection in accord with section
eight hundred forty-two." Section 842 imposes upon the respondent an injunction to main-
tain "reasonable conditions of behavior" towards the petitioner. SEe note 19 infra.
16. 38 lisc. 2d 710, 238 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. CL), aff'd mem. 20 App. Div. 2d S67,
245 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2d Dep't 1963).
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to compel a transfer reasoning that an assault with a dangerous weapon was
not within the jurisdiction of the family court.'1 The court, relying on the
New York State Constitution provision that, "the power of the grand juries...
to find indictments.., shall never be suspended or impaired by law,"', argued
that civil proceedings which bar a criminal proceeding unconstitutionally sus-
pend the power of the grand jury to indict, since under the act, issuance of an
order of disposition bars subsequent prosecution for the assault on which
the proceeding was based. 19 It is submitted that the court, by omitting signifi-
cant phrases of section six of article I of the constitution, gave it a broader
application than it was intended to have. This quoted portion of the constitu-
tion deals with inquiries by the grand jury into the wilful misconduct of public
officials in their office, and is a prohibition against laws preventing prosecutions
for such wilful misfeasance. To apply otherwise such a broad proscription to the
misconduct of private citizens, and prosecutions thereon, would render the
issuance of an order of disposition unconstitutional. The court's concern with
criminally prosecuting the defendant upon this basis was not justified. Had
the assault upon the defendant's spouse been of such a nature as to render
conciliation fruitless, then there is no question that the proceeding would have
been transferred by a family court to a criminal court, in obvious preference
to issuing an order of disposition.
In affirming, the appellate division held that the writ of prohibition is not
available to a petitioner *whose rights can be adequately preserved on appeal.
It noted that there was no showing that the petitioner had previously moved
for a transfer to family court. The court did not discuss the merits of petitioner's
argument.20
A third case denying jurisdiction to the family court in family offense
proceedings involving felony assaults is People v. Radison.21 Defendant's
motion to transfer an indictment, charging assault in the second degree upon
his wife, from the supreme court to. the family court was there denied. The
17. The court reasoned that a mandatory disposition of certain types of crimes
(e.g., felonies committed while armed with a dangerous weapon), whereby the court is
powerless to suspend sentence, makes any attempt to civilly adjudicate such a felony
contrary to the legislative intent. Bennett v. Merritt, 261 App. Div. 824, 25 N.Y.S.2d 784
(2d Dep't), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 647, 36 N.E.2d 690 (1941) (memorandum decision); N.Y.
Penal Law § 2188.
18. 38 Misc. 2d at 712, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 866, quoting N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. Section 6
states in part: "The power of Grand juries to inquire into the wilful misconduct in office
of public officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of informations in connection
with such inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law."
19. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 845 states: "When the terms of an order of disposition made
under this article are satisfied, no criminal proceeding may be commenced with respect
to the acts which would constitute disorderly conduct or assault on which the adjudication
giving rise to the order of disposition was based."
20. The appellate division indicated that a denial of a motion to transfer would have
been a proper subject on appeal if there had been a conviction. 20 App. Div. 2d 567, 245
N.Y.S.2d 846 (2d Dep't 1963) (memorandum decision).
21. 40 Misc. 2d 1063, 244 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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supreme court construed section 114 to mean that the family court acquires
"exclusive original jurisdiction" only when the complaint is initiated in the
family court, but that a transfer of an indictment from the supreme court would
be subject first to the jurisdiction of the supreme court.*2- The court emphasized
the language of section 114, which states, "The provisions of this act shall
in no way limit or impair the jurisdiction of the supreme court as set forth in
section seven of article six of the constitution .... " The court in Radison held
this to bar the transfer of such a proceeding to the family court when the
supreme court had jurisdiction and considered criminal proceedings to be
in the best interests of justice.
To give effect to the holding in Radison, a complaint alleging a felony assault
presented to the supreme court could result in defendant's being held for
trial, while under section 813(a) of the act, one presented to a county court
or other criminal court would have to be transferred to the family court for
disposition.2 3 Certainly, the legislature could not have intended that one de-
fendant be prosecuted in the supreme court as a criminal, while another would
be treated as an offending member of a family merely because the district attor-
ney chose to commence the action in a county court. Section 813(a) of the
act has the effect of precluding any such discretion on the part of the district
attorney by requiring transfer to the family court, but it also has the effect of
presenting an inconsistency that is, at present, irreconcilable, and possibly
unconstitutional.24
In the subject case,2 5 the fact that the defendant had been indicted was
discussed in relation to article VI, section 19(b) of the New York Constitu-
22. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7(a) states: "The supreme court shall have general original
jurisdiction in law and equity and the appellate jurisdiction herein provided. In the city
of New York, it shall have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes prosecuted by indictment,
provided, however, that the legislature may grant to the city-wide court of criminal
jurisdiction of the city of New York jurisdiction over misdemeanors prosecuted by indict-
ment and to the family court in the city of New York jurisdiction over crimes and
offenses ... between spouses...."
23. See note 4 supra. Outside New York City, the supreme court has concurrent juris-
diction with the county courts over felonies. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 22, 39. The lan-
guage of INY. Family Ct. Act § 313(a), requiring transfer, applies to all criminal courts,
but, as suggested by Radison, the non-impairment clause of section 114 would create an
exception to this.
24. See note 4 supra. Section 313(a) of the act, which does not exclude the supreme
court from the requirements of transfer of family offense proceedings to the family court,
could be interpreted as impairing the supreme court's general original jurisdiction, even
though section 114 of the act says that it is not supposed to do this. This possible impair-
ment could make section 313(a) unconstitutional.
Similar reasoning would require that the supreme court have original jurisdiction over
family offenses. As suggested in the instant case, the court would then be required to act
as though it were a family court. 21 App. Div. 2d at 239, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 322. It appears
that a decision by the Court of Appeals is needed to clarify this problem of jurisdiction,
though it may also require legislative amendment to article VI, section 13 of the conwtitu-
tion to cure the defect presented by the non-impairment clause.
25. 21 App. Div. 2d 236, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317 (4th Dep't 1964).
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tion.2 6 While suggesting that a valid indictment would bar a transfer, the court
reasoned that the district attorney's power to seek indictments is limited by
the constitution and the Family Court Act, and concluded that the indictment
was invalid.
This line of reasoning is subject to the qualification that the Family Court
Act does not make any provision for indictments, either limiting them, or
excluding them from the family court procedure. Constitutionally, the power of
the grand jury to indict, or to seek indictments, cannot be limited except by a
clearly defined statute.27 It similarly appears that the validity of an indictment
is not affected by the failure to make a formal complaint to a magistrate or
other official, 28 nor is the validity affected by the return of an indictment to
a court which does not have the power to try it.29 In other words, the grand
jury could independently indict the defendant for a felony assault involving
a family offense notwithstanding that the proceeding is before the family court.
However, in considering the arguments raised in Klaff, Ricapito, and Radison,
the court stated that section six of article I of the constitution was included
to protect the accused, rather than to grant to a grand jury a right to indict.9 0
The court reasoned that there was no conflict between the family court proce-
dure and the function of the grand jury since the family court function was
to decide whether criminal action was necessary, and thus whether the need
for indictment arose.
It should be noted that the legislature did not change any relevant provisions al
of the Penal Law or the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the Family
Court Act. If a felony assault is not to be treated as a crime under certain cir-
cumstances, how can this be reconciled with the legislature's failure to amend
26. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 19(b) reads: "The county court may transfer any action
or proceeding, except a criminal action or proceeding involving a felony prosecuted by
indictment or an action or proceeding required by this article to be dealt with in the .. .
family court, to any court, other than the supreme court, having jurisdiction of the subject
matter within the county provided that such other court has jurisdiction over the classes
of persons named as parties." This section deals generally with classes of actions that
are transferrable, and excludes family offense proceedings from being dealt with in any
court other than the family court. It does not exclude the transfer of felonies prosecuted by
indictment to the family court, as suggested by De Jesus.
27. See People v. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148 N.E.2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
A grand jury's power is constitutionally derived and statutorily defined. It can only be
limited by a clearly drawn statute or a court order based upon such a statute.
28. People v. McCarthy, 168 N.Y. 549, 61 N.E. 899 (1901).
29. People v. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148 N.E.2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). The grand
jury's function is to enquire into all crimes committed within the community, and to
present the indictment to an appropriate court.
30. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime . ..
unless on indictment of a grand jury . .. " N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
31. N.Y. Penal Law § 487 (Supp. 1964) substituted the words "family court" and
"family court act" in a section relating to the trial of children under sixteen. The defini-
tions of assault remain unchanged, and presumably include assaults between spouses, since
the term "assault" has a sufficiently extended meaning within the Penal Law. Section 813(b)
of the act was amended, however, to extend the definition of disorderly conduct to
include disturbances not in a public place.
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the Penal Law? One possible answer is that the acts or omissions are not to be
treated as crimes until such a determination is made by the family court judge. 2
If so, then the reason for an indictment prior to any transfer back to the
criminal court does not exist.33
Even without change in the Penal Law however, it seems inescapable that a
family court judge with jurisdiction over all family offenses can issue an order
of disposition which bars further prosecution in a criminal action,14 even where
it is admitted that a family offense constituting a felony, as defined by the
Penal Law, was committed. Since this can occur, it appears that the legislature
must have intended simply that family offenses not be prosecuted as crimes
under the Penal Law until such time as the family court decides that the interest
of society in protecting life and property through criminal actions becomes
paramount to the interest of society in the preservation of the family. These
family court proceedings are then analogous to other proceedings which become
criminal by virtue of removal.3 For example, an act, otherwise criminal, for
which the statute authorizes prosecution without indictment of a person of
the age of fifteen years as a juvenile delinquent, for what would be a felony
if committed by one over sLxteen,30 can be treated at the discretion of the
family court judge as an indictable crime and prosecution for the felony as
an adult is then authorized.
The appellate division's conclusion in the present case, that a transfer from
the criminal court to the family court is mandatory, means that the criminal
court can acquire jurisdiction only through the family court. If the criminal
court does not have jurisdiction until such time as the family court transfers
the proceeding to it, then a conviction for a family offense by the criminal
court would be invalid,37 since the failure to transfer would invalidate its own
proceedings. The criminal courts, in discussing the question of misdemeanor
32. People v. De Jesus, 21 App. Div. 2d at 240, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
33. E.g., People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1923);
People v. Kaminsky, 20S N.Y. 3S9, 102 N.E. 515 (1913).
34. No restriction is placed upon the decision of the family court judge to enter an
order of disposition by N.Y. Family CL Act § 845, nor does section Sit of the act place
any restriction upon his decision to transfer. Therefore, it is possible that he could retain
jurisdiction, even if criminal prosecution seemed advisable to the district attorney, in order
to utilize an order of disposition barring trial.
35. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 312-c(c).
36. N.Y. Penal Law § 2136.
37. N.Y. Family CL Act § 813, stating that family offense proceedings "... shall be
transferred by the criminal court... to the family court...." raises a question of statu-
tory interpretation. The word "shall" is not always mandatory. See In the Matter of State of
New York, 207 N.Y. 532, 101 N.E. 462 (1913). On the other hand, those provisions con-
cerning procedure are mandatory. It is in this respect that 'shall" becomes mandatory,
and proceedings ignoring this direction are invalid. People e% rel. Lawton v. Snell, 216
N.Y. 527, 111 N.E. 50 (1916). In that case the relator's statutory liability in a filiation
proceeding was invalidated when the procedural requirements of the statute were not
met. By implication, the statement of the appellate division in Ricapito v. People, 20 App.
Div. 2d 567, 245 N.Y.S.2d 346 (2d Dep't 1963) may also be taken to support the con-
clusion that such a criminal conviction would be invalid for lack of jurisdiction.
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assaults within the family,38 do appear to take the position that the transfer
to the family court is mandatory.
The subject case has largely reconciled the intent and purpose of the Family
Court Act with the processes of criminal procedure, but it has not overcome
the difficulty posed by Radison. The intent of the legislature to create a forum
having exclusive original jurisdiction over family offenses, and to mandate a
transfer to this court from any other court, does in fact impair the general
original jurisdiction of the supreme court. If so, then in this respect, section
813(a) of the act is unconstitutional. This is an unfortunate consequence of
what is otherwise a practical solution to the conciliation of family disputes.
Certainly, access to the family court for such disposition and conciliation as it
may provide would serve better the interests of society and the individual
families involved in preserving family unity, than would automatic criminal
prosecution.
Labor Law-Peaceful Consumer Picketing at Secondary Site Not Pro-
hibited by Section 8(b) (4) of the Labor Management Relations Act.-
Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 struck twenty-four fruit
packers and warehousemen represented by Tree Fruits Labor Relations Com-
mittee, Inc. In support of the strike, the union inaugurated a boycott of the
product at certain retail chain stores.' The boycott consisted of pickets carrying
placards 2 and distributing handbills requesting the public, including customers of
these stores, to refrain from buying the product of the primary employers. At all
times the picketing was peaceful, confined to consumer entrances and directed
solely to the consumers. No appeal was made to the consumers not to patronize
the stores. Neither the employees nor the ordinary operations of the secondary
employer were affected at any time by the presence of the pickets. Tree Fruits
charged the union with unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i)
and (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act.3 The National Labor Relations
Board found that picketing as a means of effecting a secondary boycott was illegal
38. People v. Dugar, 37 Misc. 2d 652, 235 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
The cohabitation of parties not married to each other, which produced offspring, consti-
tuted a household for the purposes of the act. Upon arraignment, the case was trans-
ferred to family court-the court concluding that a transfer was mandatory, the family
court having jurisdiction over family or household offenses. People v. Keller, 37 Misc. 2d
122, 234 N.V.S.2d 469 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1962), held similarly in determining that
a misdemeanor assault upon a mother-in-law was an assault within the family. The charge
was transferred to family court for further disposition.
1. Two pickets each appeared at more than forty stores belonging to Safeway Stores,
Inc., a national retail food chain.
2. The placard worn by each picket bore the following legend: "To the Consumer:
Non-Union Washington State apples are being sold at this store. Please do not purchase
such apples. Thank you. Teamsters Local 760, Yakima, Washington." NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 60 n.3 (1964).
3. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffiin Act) § 704(a),
73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (Supp. V, 1963), amending Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
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per se under section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) and ordered the union to cease and desist.
Because of constitutional reservations concerning blanket prohibitions of pick-
eting, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded
the case to ascertain whether the secondary employer was in fact threatened,
coerced or restrained.5 Rejecting the conclusions of both the NLRB and the
District of Columbia Circuit, the Supreme Court held that secondary consumer
picketing directed solely against the primary employer is not an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). NLRB v. Fruit & Vcge-
table Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
The late Senator Taft once remarked that there was no such thing as a
"good" secondary boycott.0 It was commonly believed that the legislation
which bears his name was intended to outlaw this particular form of union
activity 7 Intentions notwithstanding, under the Taft-Hartley formula,8 courts
had held that picketing and other union activity at the premises of a neutral
employer directed toward the consumer public and designed to solicit their aid
and cooperation in not buying the products of the primary employer were not
unlawful secondary activity, so long as such activity neither induced nor en-
couraged a concerted work stoppage by the employees of the neutralP
§ 153(b)(4) (195S), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935). The statute reads as follow,-s: "It shall
be an unfair practice for a labor organization . . . (4) . . . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce . . . where . . . an object thereof is . . . (B)
forcing or requiring any person to . . . cease doing business w:ith any other pzrson . . .
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer v.ith whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by
any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse
to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the estab-
lishment of the employer engaged in such distribution . .. ." (Emphasis omitted.)
4. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961). The Board found no violation
of § S(b)(4)(i)(B), and that issue was not raised in any subsequent proceeding. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, supra at 1176-77.
5. Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. XLRB, 303 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. 93 Cong. Rec. 4193 (1947).
7. Fleming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 666, 681 (1960).
S. Labor MIanagement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § S(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 15S(b) (4) (195S). The relevrant provisions are as follows: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . (4) to engage in, or to induce or en-
courage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, . . . (A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . to cease doing business vith
any other person . .. ."
9. It was generally held that where the picketing was restricted to entrances not used,
or not likely to be used, by employees or suppliers of the secondary employer there %,as
no violation of section 3(b) (4) (A). E.g., NLRB v. International Union of United Brewery
Workers (Coors Beer), 272 F.2d 817, 319 (10th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Business Mach. &
Office Appliance Mechanics (Royal Typewriter), 223 F.2d 553, 556 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
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While both Houses were considering major labor legislation in 1958, there
was strong feeling in executive and legislative circles that any new legislation
must include Taft-Hartley amendments to plug loopholes revealed since 1947,
including the impunity with which unions could apply pressure directly against
secondary employers.10 The House bill" contained amendments to the Taft-
Hartley Act, including an amendment to section 8(b) (4), which went beyond
any provisions of the Senate bill.' 2 This amendment would have made it an unfair
labor practice to "threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in commerce..
where ... an object thereof is: ... forcing or requiring any person ... to cease
doing business with any other person ...."13 It was feared that such language,
standing alone, would effectively seal off all avenues of appeal for consumer aid
against the struck employer.' 4
Reporting on the outcome of the conference committee, Senator Kennedy
announced that the Senate conferees had been able to secure important changes
"in the restrictive provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Bill," including "the right
to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing asking them to refrain
from buying goods made by nonunion labor and to refrain from trading with a
retailer who sells such goods."' 5 The conference agreement enacted into law
became the present general proviso to section 8(b) (4).10 It was generally be-
lieved 17 that the permissible areas of union activity under the new section in-
denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956); Crowley's Milk Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 996, 997-98, enforced,
208 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1953). However, once the picketing was extended to entrances normally
used by employees and suppliers of the secondary employer, or entrances used in common
by employees and patrons or customers, such activity constituted an unfair labor practice.
E.g., Dallas Gen. Drivers, 118 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1253 (1957), enforced, 264 F.2d 642 (5th
Cir. 1959); Laundry, Linen Supply & Dry Cleaning Drivers, 118 N.L.R.B. 1435, 1437
(1957), enforced, 262 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1958).
10. This was explained by Congressman Griffin, a sponsor of one of the House Bills:
"Under the present law, if the picketing happens to be at the employee entrance so that
clearly the purpose of the picketing is to induce the employees of the secondary employer
not to handle the products of the primary employer, the boycott could be enjoined.
"However, if the picketing happened to be around at the customer entrance, and If
the purpose of the picketing were to coerce the employer not to handle those goods, then
under the present law, because of technical interpretations, the boycott would not be
covered." 105 Cong. Rec. 15673 (1959) (exchange between Congressmen Griffin and
Brown). See also S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1959) (minority report
of Senators Goldwater and Dirksen); 105 Cong. Rec. 6667 (1959) (remarks of Senator
McClellan).
11. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
12. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
13. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63 (1959). The House passed H.R. 8342 with
the language of H.R. 8400 and substituted the text of H.R. 8400 into S. 1555, the bill
which was enacted.
14. 105 Cong. Rec. 6232 (1959) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). See also Cox, The
Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev.
257, 274 (1959).
15. 105 Cong. Rec. 17898 (1959).
16. For the text of the proviso see note 3 supra.
17. E.g., 105 Cong. Rec. 17899 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kennedy on the conference
bill); Id. at 17882 (remarks of Senator Morse in opposition to the conference bill); Id. at
cluded passing out handbills and advertising over the radio, but excluded picket-
ing at a secondary employer's site.
In light of the legislative history of the section generally, and particularly the
language of the proviso,' 8 the NLRB has consistently concluded that secondary
consumer picketing is illegal per se under section S(b) (4) (ii).1o In the instant
case, the Board decided that even though, ostensibly, the picketing was an
appeal to the public to reduce its purchases of the struck product only, the
"natural and foreseeable" and therefore intended result of such picketing was
the curtailment of business between the struck employer and the neutral which
constitutes a violation of subdivision (B).20 Predictably, the Board issued an
order to cease and desist. The District of Columbia Circuit, however, rejected
the conclusion that secondary consumer picketing per se constituted coercion of
the neutral employer.21 While conceding at least some authority in the legisla-
tive history for the Board's interpretation, the court decided, as urged by the
union, that a more "plausible" reading of the statute would show that section
8(b) (4)(ii) "outlaws only such conduct (including picketing) as in fact
threatens, coerces or restrains secondary employers, and that the proviso is
intended to exempt from regulation 'publicity other than picketing' even though
it threatens, coerces or restrains an employer."2- Apparently the court of appeals
17904 (remarks of Senator Goldwater in support of the conference bill); Cox, supra note 14;
Goldberg & Aleikeljohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments, With Emphasis on the Legis-
lative History, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 747, 757-53 (1960). See also Farmer, The Status and Appli-
cation of the Secondary-Boycott and Hot-Cargo Provisions, 48 Geo. LJ. 327, 341-42 (1959);
Fleming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 666, 652-92 (1960).
But contrary to this array of authority, it has been suggested that "vithout more, a simple
request to customers, conveyed by a picket sign, to refrain from purchasing a particular
product does not. . . violate the law. The proviso simply seeks to place... other publicity
in a more favorable position than picketing by requiring an 'effect' in addition to the prohib-
ited means and object." Prevant, The New Hot-Cargo and Secondary-Boycott Sections: A
Critical Analysis, 4S Geo. L.J. 346, 354 (1959). See also Comment, The Landrum-Griffin
Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 Cornell L.Q. 724, 731-36 (1960).
1S. For the text of the proviso see note 3 supra.
19. Blueprint Employees Union, 135 N.L.R.B. 1G90 (1962); Upholsterers Union
(Minneapolis House Furnishing Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), enforcement denied,
331 F.2d 561 (Sth Cir. 1964); United Wholesale Employees (Perfection Mlattrezs Co.), 129
NL.R.B. 1014 (1960); International Hod Carriers (Gilmore Constr. Co.), 127 N.L.R.B.
541 (1960). The Board reasoned that peaceful picketing for an objective pro-
scribed by section S(b)(4) constituted "coercion and restraint" of an employer within the
meaning of clause (ii) because such picketing was in the nature of "economic retaliation"
against a secondary employer who failed to comply vith union demands. Significantly,
in each of the above cases, as distinct from the instant case, the secondary employer had
been approached by the union at one time or another and had been given the opportunity
to cooperate voluntarily in the union's dispute with the secondary employer. If such co-
operation was forthcoming, the premises were not picketed or pickets, already installed,
were removed. Blueprint Employees, supra at 1096; Upholsterers Union, supra at 43-44;
United Wholesale Employees, supra at 1022; International Hod Carriers, supra at 545, n.6.
20. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1177-78 (1961).
21. Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962), 62 Colum.
L. Rev. 1336, 51 Geo. L.J. 201.
22. Id. at 315.
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felt constrained to avoid any interpretation of the statute which would, in its
opinion, raise serious constitutional questions. 23
In the landmark case of Thornhill v. Alabama,2 4 the Supreme Court had held
unconstitutional under the first amendment a sweeping state ban on peaceful
picketing publicizing a labor dispute. However, since then the Supreme Court
has recognized that "the loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket
lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word."'20 In various sub-
sequent decisions the Supreme Court has held that picketing may be enjoined
where the objective of such picketing is contrary to the public policy of the
state,26 including the protection of neutrals.21 The District of Columbia Circuit
distinguished these holdings from the instant case on the ground that the former
reflected a Supreme Court policy to restrict "signal" picketing, which depended
for its success on union discipline and loyalty, rather than "publicity" picketing,
which like "pure" speech depends on its persuasive appeal to the public.28 The
court reasoned that Congress could have intended to outlaw only that picketing
which did actually threaten, coerce or restrain a secondary employer. The court
of appeals remanded for a determination whether the secondary employer or
any customers were actually coerced, or whether the secondary employer
suffered or was likely to suffer "substantial economic injury," which might be
such a serious consequence as to outweigh the first amendment protection. 29
In a parallel situation, the appeal from the Board's decision in United Whole-
sale Employees (Perfection Mattress Co.) 30 upheld the Board's order to cease
and desist from unfair labor practices in violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).81
23. Id. at 315, 317. Cf. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 765-68
(1961).
24. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See generally Farmer & Williamson, Picketing and the Injunctive
Power of State Courts-From Thornhill to Vogt, 35 U. Det. L.J. 431 (1958).
25. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950).
26. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1957) (state
law making it an unfair labor practice to coerce employers to pressure employees to join
a union); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 476-79 (1950) (stato
law protecting self-employers from organizational picketing). See generally Samoff, Picketing
and the First Amendment: "Full Circle" and "Formal Surrender," 9 Lab. L.J. 889 (1958).
27. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., supra note 26; See Carpenters Union
v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1942) (state anti-trust law prohibiting picketing at
neutral sites). The Court has similarly allowed enforcement of federal policy, International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (Taft-Hartley Act making
illegal secondary boycotts which induced employees to stop working).
28. Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. NLRB, 308 F.2d at 316. The distinction between
"signal" and "publicity" picketing was initially proposed by Cox, Strikes, Picketing and
The Constitution, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 574 (1951). But see Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257, 267 n.41, 274 (1959).
29. 308 F.2d at 318; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501, 509 (1951) (over-
throw of the government by force and violence). The court of appeals decision in the Instant
case did not reach the question of what consequences were serious enough to remove
secondary consumer picketing from the category of pure speech protected by the first
amendment. 308 F.2d at 317 n.11.
30. 129 W.L.R.B. 1014 (1960), order amended, 134 N.L.R.B. 931 (1961).
31. Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963), 77 Harv. L. Rev. 361. The Board's
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Assuming the union's objective to be proscribed by subdivision (B)j- that court
specifically rejected union arguments that picketing as a means was lawful until
it was shown to threaten, coerce or restrain in fact. By so holding, the Fifth
Circuit declined to follow the District of Columbia Circuit. The Fifth Circuit
found that the Board's interpretation embodied an appreciation of the twofold
purpose of the section which was designed to protect the neutral from "possibly
devastating effects as a result of a controversy in which he had no real part" and
the primary employer from "cyclonic economic pressures through the loss of
business .. . 2" In the Fifth Circuit's opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit
not only ignored the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of Congress
because of groundless constitutional fears, " but also nullified the statute by
requiring that "threatened damage be actually sustained, or that one feeling the
pinch furnish specific answers to metaphysical inquiries as to the harm suffered."3o
The Fifth Circuit's decision was announced slightly more than a month after
the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Fruit & Vegetable Pachcrs. 7 In
the instant case, the Supreme Court established at the outset that in the consti-
tutionally sensitive realm of regulatory legislation of picketing it was the habit
of Congress to proceed only against Tecific evils which experience had revealed
were undesirable, and that it was the Court's own policy to ascribe to Congress
no broader objectives than were dearly indicated in the legislative historyFl
Within this framework, the Court concluded that the evil Congress sought to
proscribe by section 8(b) (4) was an appeal to the public not to patronize an
innocent secondary employer rather than an appeal to the public not to buy a
particular product of the struck employer z1  A union is free to attempt a total
secondary boycott against a neutral by any means other than picketing, provided
the means used do not cut off deliveries or induce a work stoppageA0 However,
if a union chooses to employ pickets the boycott must be directed solely against
the product of the primary employer. The Court rationalized that:
when consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to buy the struck
order was enforced in part, modified in part and reversed in part. That part of the order
which concerned section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was affirmed.
32. Burr v. NNLRB, 321 F.2d at 617.
33. Id. at 619.
34. Id. at 617-18. The court relied heavily on the exchanges on the floor of Congres
during the passage of the act. See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 621-22. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. This court rejected
the District of Columbia Circuit's focusing the evolution of the concepts of free ±pacdi
and picketing in terms of "signal against publicity" as inappropriate in this ease. "In the
legislative judgment, to 'signal' persons into a sympathetic refusal to handle goods is no
more obstructive than to bring about the same ultimate objective-cezsation of bu-inecs
with the primary employer-through coercive pressures on the secondary employer. To
tag one method as 'consumer picketing' does not afford a constitutional insulation denied
to the other. When the purpose of the conduct is the same, it is for Congress to determine
that similar restraints may be imposed." (Emphasis omitted.)
36. Id. at 621.
37. 374 U.S. 804 (1963).
38. 377 U.S. at 62-63. See ,NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 US. 274, 284 (1960).
39. 377 U.S. at 63-64.
40. Id. at 70-71.
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product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute. The site of the
appeal is expanded to include the premises of the secondary employer, but if the
appeal succeeds, the secondary employers' purchases from the struck firms are de-
creased only because the public has diminished its purchases of the struck product.
On the other hand, when consumer picketing is employed to persuade customers not
to trade at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck product,
not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to inflict injury
on his business generally. In such case, the union does more than merely follow the
struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer.41
Acknowledging that this distinction was never drawn by any member of Congress
during any of the debates over the issue of consumer picketing 42 the Court went
to great lengths to distinguish passages in the legislative history which were
persuasive evidence of a belief by some members of Congress, at least, that this
section did indeed ban all consumer picketing at neutral secondary sites.48 Find-
ing, in addition, that the only statements specifically dealing with the problem
presented by the instant case were put on record by those opposed to the bill,
the Court regarded them more as a barometer of certain zeal to defeat a bill
than an accurate guide to the scope of a statute.44 Recognition of fears in other
circles46 that the ordinary consumer may not be sophisticated enough to dis-
tinguish between a total boycott and a primary product boycott did not give
the Court any authority to uphold "a broad condemnation of peaceful picketing
... [which] has never been adopted by Congress .... "40 Under the Court's
reading of the section, even though the result of the picketing is to force the
neutral to cease doing business with the primary employer, an objective clearly
proscribed by subdivision (B), so long as the union has observed the limits
marked off in this opinion for such picketing there is no violation of section
8(b) (4) (ii). 4 7
The dissenting opinion in the instant case rejected "the fine distinction which
the Court draws between general and limited product picketing.148 Considering
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id. at 64. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 65-70.
44. Id. at 66. "The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to
the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the
statutory words is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
394-95 (1951). On a later occasion, citing Schwegmann Bros., the Court warned that "an
unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of the majority and thus, In-
directly, amend a bill." Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956). In
the former case the opposition consisted of the minority report of the Senate committee
presented in debate by one senator, and in the latter of a similar minority report not
even commented on in debate.
45. The Court is obviously referring to the dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan and
Stewart, 377 U.S. at 82-83. The majority opinion is generally supported by Jones, Picketing
and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (1953), while Gregory,
Picketing and Coercion: A Defense, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1953), reflects the fears of the
minority.
46. 377 U.S. at 71.
47. Id. at 72-73.
48. Id. at 82 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 33
the history of the statute, Justices Harlan and Stewart found it "indeed remark-
able that the Court not only substantially acknowledges that the statutory
language does not itself support this distinction ...but cites no report of
Congress, no statement of a legislator, not even the view of any of the many com-
mentators in the area, in any way casting doubt on the applicability of section
S(b) (4) (ii) (B) to picketing of the kind involved here."49 Concluding that this
distinction was never intended, they felt the Board's order should be reinstated.
This interpretation of the statute raised the constitutional question avoided by
the Court; but the dissenters felt that the congressional balancing of the right
of unions to publicize labor disputes, with the right of society to be free from
certain undesirable effects unrelated to the communicative aspect of picketing,
was within the constitutional safety zone delineated by the Court.L 'O
In a concurring opinion strongly reminiscent of earlier dissents in Carpenters
Union v. Ritter's Cafez' and International Bhd. of Teamstcrs v. Hanke , 2 'Mr.
Justice Black took exception to the conclusions of the dissenters on the constitu-
tional issues. Construed to ban all consumer picketing, as he thought it must be,
the section indicated no more than a congressional intent to "prevent dissemina-
tion of information about the facts of a labor dispute .... V03 In his opinion so
manifest an abridgment of the first amendment could not be sustained even
though Congress left other avenues of communication open to the union.p
Conceding that the dual nature of picketing, being at once communication and
patrolling, lent itself to regulation, the Justice reminded the dissenters that it
was their duty to "weigh" the reasons advanced before sustaining any encroach-
ment on the enjoyment of the constitutional right of free speech.5 Weighing
the facts of the instant case, he found no congressional intent either to promote
public order G or to prohibit an illegal objective" by regulating patrolling.
Therefore, he found Congress' thinly veiled attempt to take away by degrees
what it could not do outright tantamount to holding "that governmental sup-
pression of a newspaper in a city would not violate the First Amendment be-
cause there continue to be radio and television stations),*S
Mr. Justice Black's reaction is predictable. Since Thornhill, he has con-
sistently "insisted on a grant of constitutional immunization for peaceful
picketing,"z' 3 unless it is an "integral" part of "conduct otherwise unlaw-
49. Id. at 83-84 (dissenting opinion).
50. Id. at 93-94 (dissenting opinion).
51. 315 U.S. 722, 729 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
52. 339 U.S. 470, 431 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
53. 377 U.S. at 73 (concurring opinion).
54. Id. at 79-SO (concurring opinion).
55. Id. at 77-73 (concurring opinion). See Thornhill v. Mabama, 310 U.S. SS, 96 (1940);
Schneider v. State, 303 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
56. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Thornhill v.. Alabam:,
supra note 55, at 105; Schneider v. State, supra note 55, at 10-61.
57. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 499-SCO (1949).
53. 377 U.S. at 80 (concurring opinion).
59. Farmer & Rliam-son, supra note 24, at 441. See International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 431 (1950); Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722,
729 (1942). Mr. Justice Black also concurred in Mr. Justice Douglas' dis-ant in Tcamstem
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ful." 60 However, the Court in Thornhill overturned a state statute invalid on its
face because it not only prohibited peaceful picketing but also "every practicable
method whereby the facts of a labor dispute may be publicized in the vicinity
of the place of business of an employer."61 In discussing picketing as a facet
of communication generally protected under the first amendment, the Court in
Thornhill never specifically equated picketing to free speech. 2 This often ignored
aspect of Thornhill was referred to by Mr. Justice Black himself writing for a
unanimous Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.' 3 In spite of his
vigorous dissents, on other occasions the Court has declared:
It is true that by peaceful picketing workingmen communicate their grievances. As
a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute, peaceful picketing may be a
phase of the constitutional right of free utterance. But recognition of peaceful picket-
ing as an exercise of free speech does not imply that the States must be without power
to confine the sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute. Restric-
tion of picketing to the area of the industry within which a labor dispute arises leaves
open to the disputants other traditional modes of communication.0 '
It is difficult to predict where the Court will go from here. It is even more
difficult to predict where Congress can go from here. The logic of the NLRB and
the opinions supporting it 65 is rooted in the theory that, "like other self-help
devices of organized labor, picketing is used because it compels ... [employers]
to conform to the economic desires of the labor unions . . . because of the dam-
age caused to the picketed enterprise . . . ."6 In rejecting the conclusion that
picketing per se implies or effects coercion, the Court restricted its consideration
to an exegesis of picketing as a means without regard to motive or effect. A dis-
cussion of this tripartite aspect of picketing undoubtedly would have led the
Court to a confrontation with the constitutional problems latent in the statute.
It is unlikely that a decision based upon such a confrontation would be less
desirable than one based upon a painstaking effort to put words into the mouth
of Congress. Considering the instant case in vacuo, it cannot be denied that the
result reached by the Court is just. It is unfortunate that the first case testing a
statute designed to protect secondary employers was initiated solely by a pri-
mary employer. It is even more unfortunate that the Court made no attempt to
confine its opinion to the unique facts of this case.
Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 295 (1957) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Douglas
did not participate in the instant case.
60. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). See Building Service
Employees v. Gazzam, 339 US. 532 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 469
(1950).
61. 310 U.S. at 100.
62. The first specific identification of picketing with free speech was made by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in an opinion upholding, ironically, a general injunction against picketing
because of a past history of violence. Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 292 (1941).
63. 336 U.S. at 499.
64. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1942).
65. See notes 19, 20, & 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
66. Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (1940).
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Taxation-Assessment-Valuation of Prestige Office Building Based Par-
tially on Cost of Construction Upheld.-Appellant, owner-tenant of the
Seagram Building' in New York City, contended that the respondent Tax
Commission, which considered the cost of construction in its assessment of the
building, was not justified in departing from the traditional method of valua-
tion. The supreme court entered an order confirming the taxation assessments
for the period in issue. The appellate division affirmed 2 holding that the recent
cost of construction may be considered in tax valuation where that amount
differs significantly from the figure derived from the usual capitalization of net
income method. In a four-to-three decision, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed, noting that in certain assessment cases the actual cost of construction
may be "some evidence" of value, and holding that the hypothetical rent of the
owner-tenant may be at a higher rate than that actually paid by the other
tenants. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Tax Con n'n, 14 N.Y.2d 314, 200
N.E.2d 447, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1964).
The word "value" has many different meanings, which, unfortunately, is to
say that it has no precise meaning a3 New York law provides that property
should be assessed at its "full value." 4 Full value, as construed by the courts,
means fair market value, i.e., the price which a willing buyer would pay, and
which a willing seller would accept [hereinafter referred to as "value in ex-
change"].' This value in exchange concept of market value must be distinguished
from the value to the owner, or value in use. Professor Bonbright, in his treatise
on valuation,6 observed that the former is an objective standard, while the latter
is subjective. However, as noted above, the question in New York is not whether
the value to the owner or the value in exchange concept should be used, but
rather which method of calculating the market value should be used.
1. The Seagram Building, designed by Ludwig Mlies van der Robe and Philip Johnson,
and located at 375 Park Avenue in New York City, is widely acclaimed as one of the
most beautiful buildings of its type in the world.
2. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Tax Comm'n, 18 App. Div. 2d 109, 238 N.17.2d 228
(1st Dep't 1963).
3. The lerriam-Webster New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1957) lists seventeen
definitions.
4. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 306 states: "All real property in each azzesing unit
shall be assessed at the full value thereof." Full value has been the standard of asessment
in New York since 1914. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 153-1.0(b) provides: "The assessed valu-
ation of each ... parcel shall be set down.., in two columns. In the first column shall
be stated, opposite each such parcel, the sum for which such parcel would sell under
ordinary circumstances if wholly unimproved; and in the second column, the sum for
which such parcel would sell under ordinary circumstances with the improvements, if
any thereon." These two laws are to be' read together. People ex rel. Parklin Operating
Corp. v. Miller, 2S7 N.Y. 126, 3S N.E.2d 465 (1941).
5. People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp., supra note 4; Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Tax Commn,
19 App. Div. 2d 56, 240 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1st Dep't 1963); People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Comm'n,
17 App. Div. 2d 225, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Ist Dep't 1962); Knid:erbocker Village, Inc. %.
Boyland, 16 App. Div. 2d 223, 226 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1st Dep't 1962); Queensbury Hotel Corp.
v. Board of Assessors, 33 Aisc. 2d 302, 226 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. CL 1962); Ddaware,
Lackawanna & Western R.R. v. Sims, 31 1.isc. 2d 770, 219 N.Y.S.2d 6S9 (Sup. CL 1961).
6. 1 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 14-16, 67-68 (1937).
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Of the various methods utilized in determining the fair market value of com-
mercial realty,7 capitalization of net income is the one traditionally used in
New York.8 It makes possible an accurate computation of the amount that a
real estate investor would pay, in the hope of getting a reasonable return on his
investment.
Simply stated, this method involves three steps: (1) determination of the
annual net earnings by deducting probable maintenance and operation expenses
from the expected gross rental income. Actual records from past experience, or
from similar buildings provide a basis for the computation of this figure; (2)
determination of the "factor" (expressed as either a whole number or as a per-
centage) by which to multiply the net income. In order to obtain an accurate
result, this "factor" must reflect the risk involved to the investor-buyer, the cur-
rent interest rates, and possible declining income from the property; and (3)
multiplication of the net earnings (step 1 supra) by the "factor" (step 2 s11pra).9
7. For a general discussion of possible methods to be used in real estate valuation for
mortgage purposes, see In re New York Title & Mortgage Co. (Series B-K), 21 N.Y.S.2d
575 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Three methods are frequently discussed in tax assessment cases: (1) capitalization of
net income; (2) sales of comparable property; and (3) reconstruction cost less depredation.
The first of these is discussed in the text; and, since every parcel of real estate is considered
to be unique, is favored over the second due to its greater accuracy. Reconstruction cost
less depredation is used in New York as a ceiling on the valuations reached by any other
methods.
See generally United States v. Tampa Garden Apartments, Inc., 294 F.2d 598 (th Cir.
1961); United States v. Certain Interests in Property in Cascade County, Montana, 205
F. Supp. 745 (D. Mont. 1962); United States v. Certain Interests in Property in Monterey
County, California, 186 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Cal. 1960); People ex rel. Parklin Operating
Corp. v. Miller, 287 N.Y. 126, 38 N.E.2d 465 (1941).
8. 14 N.Y.2d at 319, 200 N.E.2d at 449, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (dissenting opinion);
People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v. Miller, supra note 7; In the Matter of the City
of New York (James Madison Houses), 17 App. Div. 2d 317, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1st Dep't
1962).
9. De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 564, 290 P.2d 544,
556 (1955). "An apt example of determining the value of property by the capitalization
of net income method is [to] . . . assume that the most effective use that may be made
of an item of property is the rental thereof, that the property may be rented for a period
of three years (at the end of which it will be worthless) for a gross rental of $120 a year,
to be paid at the end of the year, that the expenses, e.g., repairs, of the lessor incident to
the property will be $20 a year, also to be paid at the end of the year, and that a 6 percent
rate of return is appropriate to the amount of risk involved to the lessor. The value of the
property will be determined as follows:
Annual gross income $120.00
Annual expenses 20.00
Annual net income $100.00
Present worth of $100 to be received:
1 year in the future ($100x.9434) $ 94.34
2 years in the future ($100x.89) 89.00
3 years in the future ($100x.8396) 83.96
Value of property $267.30"
Id. at 565, 290 P.2d at 556.
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Under the capitalization of net income method, the Tax Commission's valua-
tion in the instant case could reasonably be computed only by placing a dispro-
portionate rental value on the space occupied by the owner, i.e., a value in excess
of the rate charged the regular tenants.' 0 The inclusion of such an arbitrary
amount in the annual gross income strikes at the essence of the objectivity of
this method, and, in effect, destroys an accurate method of computing marbet
value.
In an attempt to establish some basis for this hypothetical value placed on
the space occupied by the owner, Chief Judge Desmond, writing for the ma-
jority, referred to the high cost of construction" and concluded that such cost
was "some evidence of value."' 2 In support of this proposition, Judge Desmond
relied on 5 East 71st Street, Inc. v. Boyland'3 and 860 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Tax
Commz'n.14
In 5 East 71st Street, Inc., the proprietary tenants of a Manhattan luxury
apartment building appealed from allegedly excessive assessments for the tax
years 1949-1950 through 1956-1957. The builder purchased the land in 1946 for
$325,000. The 1948 construction cost of the building was $1,499,794.64. The
Tax Commission valuation for this period was approximately $1,350,000.
Appellants paid a total of $1,832,000, a figure sufficiently in excess of the
construction cost to provide a profit for the builder. In ultimately upholding the
original assessment, the court of appeals cited the original cost of the land and
building in 1946, and the "sharp increase" in values since, as sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the valuation.
860 Fifth Ave. Corp. also involved the accuracy of a tax assessment of a
recently constructed luxury co-operative and the probative value of its sale
price. Neither the appellate division's nor the court of appeals' opinion gave
specific figures on the cost of the land and buildings. In the last paragraph of
his opinion however, Judge Van Voorhis concluded: (1) cost of new construc-
tion, or reproduction cost less depreciation, establishes the maximum allowable
assessment, and is otherwise not useful unless the building would be reproduced
at the time in question; (2) these figures however, may be considered as a
"factor" or "some evidence of value" if the building is well suited (economically,
not architecturally) to the site, and the tax years in question follow "soon after
the construction" of the building; (3) "the fact that these co-operative apart-
ments were transferred to tenant owners at prices high enough to secure a profit
to the promoters after defraying costs of land and building, indicates that the
promoters' capital was not wasted, and that the land and buildings were adapted
to the site worth what they cost when they were acquired and constructed."' 0
In effect, the court was saying that if a businessman makes a profit in a
transaction, then, the price he paid, or cost to him, is some evidence of the value
10. There was no dispute as to the factor to be applied. 14 N.Y.2d at 31S, ZCO X.E.2d
at 448, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63.
11. Id. at 317, 200 N.T.2d at 44S, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
12. Ibid.
13. 7 N.Y.2d 859, 164 N.E.2d S66, 196 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1959) (memorandum dec&on).
14. 8 App. Div. 2d 605, 184 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1st Dep't 1959) (memorandum dcdion),
aff'd, 8 N.Y1.2d 29, 167 N.E.2d 455, 200 N.Y.S.2d S17 (1960).
15. 8 N.Y.2d at 32, 167 N.E2d at 456, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
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of the property. Reasoning such as this, however valid it may be as a practical
matter in a particular case, does much to obscure the vital conceptual distinc-
tion between cost and market value.16 As Professor Bonbright noted, "the courts
have been ready to assume a far closer correspondence between the value of the
property and its cost, especially its replacement cost, than unprejudiced experts
would concede to be warranted, or than intelligent businessmen or investors
have accepted as a basis for purchase and sale." 17 In dealings between business-
men, the two results may, at times, be numerically close, but they are always
conceptually quite distinct.
In the instant case, the dissent appears on far firmer ground in distinguishing
between value in use and value in exchange, noting that New York law specifies
assessment at fair market value-thus necessarily excluding "any element that
is unique to the present owner of a building."' 8
The arbitrary nature of the Tax Commission assessment and subsequent court
treatment of the appeal was most clearly pointed out by Judge Burke in dis-
cussing the difficulty of distinguishing the apparently contrary holding of
Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Tax Comm'n:19 "Since both [buildings] are new, held for busi-
ness rental, and used as headquarters for the owner, the only difference is the
presumed benefit accruing to the Seagram Company from having its name asso-
ciated with an architecturally superior and well-known building." 20 The appellate
division in Pepsi-Cola, in a reference to its decision on the instant set of facts,
stated that the Pepsi-Cola Building was not "in the same category as the Sea-
gram Building, that is, a newly-erected structure built especially for prestige and
advertising value as well as for the headquarters use of its owner." 21
It would seem then, if there is any distinction between the instant case and
the Pepsi-Cola case, it lies in the architectural evaluation made by the tax
assessor, resulting in the addition of a highly unpredictable consideration to an
already complex situation.22 Rather than take this opportunity to clarify the law2 '
and simultaneously promote better architecture, a majority of the New York
Court of Appeals chose to confuse the former and stifle the latter.
16. 1 Bonbright, op. cit. supra note 6, at 19-22, 140-76.
17. Id. at 20.
18. 14 N.Y.2d at 320, 200 N.E.2d at 450, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 465 (dissenting opinion).
19. 19 App. Div. 2d 56, 240 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1st Dep't 1963).
20. 14 N.Y.2d at 320, 200 N.E.2d at 449, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 464 (dissenting opinion).
21. 19 App. Div. 2d at 59, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
22. It ill be interesting to observe the tax treatment of the soon-to-be-completed
CBS Building, a "prestige" building designed by the late Eero Saarinen.
23. Since the Tax Commission arrived at the higher valuation in this case by assigning
a higher than average rental income figure to the space occupied by Seagram & Sons, It
would be interesting to see how they would "compute" this value to an owner who was
not a tenant, but who would still receive the "benefit" of having its name associated with
a building. Also, it would seem to follow that the less space the owner occupies, the pro-
portionally higher the rent would have to be in order to reach the desired percentage of
construction cost.
